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Gamson's Law and Hedonic Games

Author

Listed:
  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio
  • Weber, Shlomo
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Le Breton, Michel & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio & Weber, Shlomo, 2006. "Gamson's Law and Hedonic Games," IDEI Working Papers 420, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:6451
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    File URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2006/gamson.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    3. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, August.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Political Games," NBER Working Papers 12749, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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