[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/igi/igierp/336.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program

Author

Listed:
  • Fernanda Brollo
Abstract
In 2003 the Brazilian central government (CG) launched an anti-corruption program. Since then municipalities have been randomly selected to be audited on a monthly basis. Evidence in the literature suggests that the probability of re-election of an incumbent mayor decreases as the number of reported corruption violations rises before the municipal elections. By exploiting the exogenous variation in the timing of the release of the audit reports and the Brazilian institutional scheme, this paper sheds light on the mechanisms through which the Brazilian anti-corruption program functions. After the release of the audit reports, municipalities where more than two corruption violations were reported receive 26% fewer transfers from the CG. Total expenditure on infrastructure is also reduced. While the CG increases the amount of transfers to municipalities where the mayor is both affiliated with the partys president and found to be honest, it helps politically aligned municipalities with high levels of released corruption to move through the punishment process more quickly. The effects of the dissemination of corruption information on the probability of re-election of incumbent mayors seem to gradually disappear with time. Yet, when these effects have completely faded and voters have time to feel the consequences of receiving fewer transfers, the probability of re-election of corrupt politicians decreases.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernanda Brollo, 2008. "Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program," Working Papers 336, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:336
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/wp/2008/336.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 97, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April.
    3. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, June.
    4. Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "A Note on the Hybrid Equilibrium in the Besley-Smart Model," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 727, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit Reports," IZA Discussion Papers 2843, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
    7. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    8. Peters, John G. & Welch, Susan, 1980. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 697-708, September.
    9. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 101-127, January.
    10. David Strömberg, 2004. "Radio's Impact on Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 189-221.
    11. Sonin, Konstantin, 2010. "Provincial protectionism," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 111-122, June.
    12. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
    13. Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 817-830, June.
    14. Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 705-727, April.
    15. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Lupin Rahman & Vijayendra Rao, 2004. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 416-426, 04/05.
    16. Benjamin A. Olken, 2007. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(2), pages 200-249.
    17. Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2004. "Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 679-705.
    18. Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 259-267, 04/05.
    19. Golden, M. & Picci, L., 2007. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–1994," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0767, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
    21. Stromberg, David, 2001. "Mass media and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 652-663, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo J. Bobonis & Luis R. Cámara Fuertes & Rainer Schwabe, 2016. "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2371-2405, August.
    2. Farzana Afridi, & Sourav Bhattacharya, & Amrita Dhillon, & Eilon Solan,, 2021. "Electoral Competition, Accountability and Corruption:Theory and Evidence from India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 569, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    3. Gustavo J Bobonis & Luis R Cámara Fuertes & Rainer Schwabe, 2011. "The Dynamic Effects of Information on Political Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Puerto Rico," Working Papers tecipa-428, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Lindsey Carson & Mariana Mota Prado, 2014. "Mapping Corruption and its Institutional Determinants in Brazil," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series iriba_wp08, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    5. Antonio Estache, 2014. "Infrastructure and Corruption: a Brief Survey," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-152, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Kis-Katos, Krisztina & Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko, 2017. "The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 344-365.
    3. Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Walton, Michael, 2011. "Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa," Working Paper Series rwp11-036, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Björkman, Martina & Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Local Accountability," Seminar Papers 749, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    5. Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2009. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1278-1308, September.
    6. Julia Cage, 2009. "Asymmetric information, rent extraction and aid efficiency," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575055, HAL.
    7. Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko & Kis-Katos, Krisztina & Schulze, Günther G., 2014. "Administrative Overspending in Indonesian Districts: The Role of Local Politics," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 166-183.
    8. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    9. Bjorkman, Martina & Svensson, Jakob, 2007. "Power to the people : evidence from a randomized field experiment of a community-based monitoring project in Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4268, The World Bank.
    10. Jan Palguta, 2015. "Political Rent-Seeking in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Entry of Political Challengers at Electoral Thresholds," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp549, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    11. Niehaus, Paul & Sukhtankar, Sandip, 2013. "The marginal rate of corruption in public programs: Evidence from India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 52-64.
    12. Krisztina Kis-Katos & Günther G. Schulze, 2013. "Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 27(1), pages 79-109, May.
    13. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    14. Jeffrey B. Nugent, 2014. "Detecting Corruption And Evaluating Programs To Control It: Some Lessons For Mena," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Ishac Diwan (ed.), UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS, chapter 7, pages 131-163, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    15. Kosec, Katrina & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2020. "Can information improve rural governance and service delivery?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    16. Emilie Caldeira & Martial Foucault & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2014. "Does Decentralization Facilitate Access to Poverty-Related Services? Evidence from Benin," NBER Chapters, in: African Successes, Volume I: Government and Institutions, pages 57-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Yan Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2012. "How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide," NBER Working Papers 17981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Oana Borcan & Mikael Lindahl & Andreea Mitrut, 2017. "Fighting Corruption in Education: What Works and Who Benefits?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 180-209, February.
    19. Donati, Dante, 2023. "Mobile Internet access and political outcomes: Evidence from South Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    20. Svaleryd, Helena & Vlachos, Jonas, 2009. "Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 355-372, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:336. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.igier.unibocconi.it/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.