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The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria

Author

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  • Sergiu Hart
  • Noam Nisan
Abstract
We consider the complexity of finding a Correlated Equilibrium in an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries for players' utilities at pure strategy profiles. Many randomized regret-matching dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium quickly: in time that is polynomial in the number of players, n, the number of strategies of each player, m, and the approximation error, 1/?. Here we show that both randomization and approximation are necessary: no efficient deterministic algorithm can reach even an approximate equilibrium and no efficient randomized algorithm can reach an exact equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan, 2013. "The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp647, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp647
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A General Class Of Adaptive Strategies," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 3, pages 47-76, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics And Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 8, pages 165-189, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    4. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 2, pages 17-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2013. "How Long To Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity Of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 10, pages 215-249, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Jiang, Albert Xin & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2015. "Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 347-359.
    7. Sergiu Hart & David Schmeidler, 2013. "Existence Of Correlated Equilibria," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 1, pages 3-14, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead To Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 7, pages 153-163, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
    10. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8408, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ayan Bhattacharya, 2019. "On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, January.
    2. Bhaskar, Umang & Ligett, Katrina & Schulman, Leonard J. & Swamy, Chaitanya, 2019. "Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 533-569.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C8 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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