Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees
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- Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad, 2020. "Social acceptability of Condorcet committees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 14-27.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers 1906, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers halshs-02003292, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Issofa Moyouwou & Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi, 2023.
"Combining diversity and excellence in multiwinner elections,"
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- Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Combining diversity and excellence in multi winner elections," Working Papers 2023-05, CRESE.
- Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023.
"Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 489-510, October.
- Issofa Moyouwou & Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi, 2022. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Working Papers hal-04222352, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2022. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Working Papers 2022-05, CRESE.
- Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Post-Print hal-04419877, HAL.
- Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020.
"Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 205-229, March.
- Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020. "Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections," Post-Print hal-03544908, HAL.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022.
"When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Post-Print hal-03335584, HAL.
- Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2022. "Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures," Working Papers hal-03614587, HAL.
- Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2023.
"Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures,"
Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer (ed.), Advances in Collective Decision Making, pages 25-42,
Springer.
- Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2023. "Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures," Post-Print hal-03614587, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Voting; Multiwinner Elections; Committee; Condorcet; Social Acceptability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2019-03-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2019-03-11 (Microeconomics)
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