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Will Bank Transparency really Help Financial Markets and Regulators?

Author

Listed:
  • Karima Bouaiss

    (UT - Université de Tours)

  • Hervé Alexandre

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Catherine Refait-Alexandre

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract
The transparency of credit institutions is currently an issue of crucial importance not only with regard to the adaptation of regulatory tools (Basle II, IAS-IFRS international norms etc.)but also to the banking, financial and economic consequences. The current crisis places the importance of information about all banking activities centre stage in any debate. At a time when banks are controlled more than ever before, it is surprising to see them being swamped with criticism about their opaqueness and their reluctance to communicate, especially about the risks they are taking. This paper therefore, presents state of the art works on disclosure and bank transparency.It deals with questioning whether it is beneficial or not to increase disclosure levels in order to improve the discipline that the regulators and the markets exert on the banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Karima Bouaiss & Hervé Alexandre & Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 2017. "Will Bank Transparency really Help Financial Markets and Regulators?," Working Papers hal-01637917, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01637917
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01637917v1
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    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01637917v1/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    Market discipline; Banking crises; Bank transparency;
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