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The Core of a coalitional exchange economy

Author

Listed:
  • Elena L. del Mercato

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CSEF - Centre of Studies in Economics and Finance - UNISA - Università degli Studi di Salerno = University of Salerno)

Abstract
In pure exchange economies, a poor attention has been given to how the individual consumption possibilities of the members of a coalition should be represented. It seems economically reasonable that our knowledge and our possibility to make decisions depend on the coalition we belong to. We define a coalitional exchange economy by considering a pure exchange economy in which the individual consumption sets of consumers within a coalition depend on the membership of the coalition. Our definition includes as a particular case the classical definition of pure exchange economy. We adapt the core concept to a coalitional exchange economy, and we show the non-emptiness of the core. Finally, we discuss more general setting where individual preferences are also depending on the coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena L. del Mercato, 2006. "The Core of a coalitional exchange economy," Post-Print halshs-00118765, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00118765
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00118765
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Border, Kim C, 1984. "A Core Existence Theorem for Games without Ordered Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1537-1542, November.
    3. Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 143-148, February.
    4. Volker Boehm, 1974. "The Core of an Economy with Production," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(3), pages 429-436.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Pietro & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Vincenzo Platino, 2022. "Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 487-508, April.
    2. Emma Moreno-García & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2020. "Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 125-147, February.
    3. Graziano, Maria Gabriella & Meo, Claudia & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 267-286.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumption possibility; exchange economy; core; Cooperative game; coeur; Jeu coopératif; économie d'échange; possibilité individuelle de consommation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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