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Local Government and Innovation: the case of Italian provinces

Author

Listed:
  • Pierpaolo Parrotta
  • Marianna Marino

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Fortuna Casoria
  • Davide Sala
Abstract
This paper exploits quasi-natural experiments associated with three waves of reforms occurred in Italy in 1992, 2001 and 2004, to establish 8, 4, and 3 new provinces, respectively. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find evidence of a significant detrimental effect of (further) decentralization on innovation in Northern and Central Italian provinces. We argue that this finding can be rationalized with the costs imposed by the “mafia transplantation†phenomenon, as we find that the new provinces that were more exposed to “mafiosi in confino†reduced their innovation output extensively. We perform a number of robustness checks that corroborate our main findings.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Pierpaolo Parrotta & Marianna Marino & Fortuna Casoria & Davide Sala, 2020. "Local Government and Innovation: the case of Italian provinces," Post-Print hal-03564901, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03564901
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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