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Externality and common-pool resources: The case of artesian aquifers

Author

Listed:
  • Hubert Stahn

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Agnes Tomini

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
This study examines a specific class of common-pool resources whereby rivalry is not characterized by competition for the resource stock. Artesian aquifers are a typical example of such resources since the stock never depletes, even when part of the resource is extracted. We first propose a dynamic model to account for the relevant features of such aquifers such as the water pressure and well yield and characterize the corresponding dynamics. We then compare the social optimum with the private exploitation of an open-access aquifer. The comparison of these two equilibria highlights the existence of a new source of inefficiency. In the long run, this so-called pressure externality results in an additional number of wells for the same water consumption, thereby raising costs. Finally, we characterize a specific stock-dependent tax to neutralize the pressure externality.

Suggested Citation

  • Hubert Stahn & Agnes Tomini, 2021. "Externality and common-pool resources: The case of artesian aquifers," Post-Print hal-03408305, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03408305
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102493
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-03408305
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common-pool resource; Externality; Optimal management; Public regulation; Dynamic optimization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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