Can a specific performance contract solve the hold-up problem?
[Un contrat à obligation d’exécution peut-il résoudre le problème du hold-up ?]
Author
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.3917/reco.623.0545
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02647357
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
- Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Andrew Postlewaite, 2007.
"Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 662-684, October.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jan 2006.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003. "Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3576, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-26, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 447, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 2835, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994.
"Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-282, March.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994. "Renegotiation design with unverifiable information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Scholarly Articles 12375014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2002. "Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 798-817, September.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1994.
"Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1085-1124.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1993. "Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature," Papers 183, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer.
- Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006.
"Undescribable Events,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 849-868.
- Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Undescribable Events," CESifo Working Paper Series 1092, CESifo.
- Lando, Henrik & Rose, Caspar, 2004. "On the enforcement of specific performance in Civil Law countries," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 473-487, December.
- Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:28:y:2007:i:35:p:a0 is not listed on IDEAS
- Wagener, Andreas, 2006. "Chebyshev's Algebraic Inequality and comparative statics under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 217-221, September.
- Andrew Wait & Andrew Wait, 2007. "Workshop on Organization Economics: Theory and Evidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(35), pages 1.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- M'hand Fares, 2009. "Specific Performance, Separability Condition and the Hold-Up Problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2055-2062.
- Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006.
"Construction Contracts (or “How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?”),"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1714, CESifo.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Construction Contracts (or: "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?")," IZA Discussion Papers 2125, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts: Over and Under Investment of Concessioned Public Infrastructure," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv106, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
- Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012.
"Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- James R. Brennan & Joel Watson, 2013.
"The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, July.
- Watson, Joel & Brennan, Jim, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4242n025, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Alan Schwartz, 2004.
"The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
- Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, "undated". "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
- M’hand Fares, 2009. "Specific performance, separability condition and the hold-up problem," Post-Print hal-02655908, HAL.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2004.
"Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 3-30, March.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2000. "Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 407, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2000. "Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3582, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004.
"Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In,"
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 2004. "Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19316, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999.
"From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions,"
Post-Print
halshs-03704424, HAL.
- Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions," MPRA Paper 37887, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2002.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j99008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Diego Comin, 2005.
"Testing Out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer,"
Departmental Working Papers
200501, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Diego Comin, 2005. "Testing out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer," NBER Working Papers 11110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Willington, 2013.
"Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
- C. Manuel Willington, "undated". "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv144, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
- C. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 231, Econometric Society.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999.
"Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 23-50, February.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs," MPRA Paper 28483, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Evans, 2008.
"Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 459-491, May.
- Evans, R., 2006. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0627, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.
- Evelyn Korn & Stephan Meisenzahl, 2009. "Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200909, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold‐Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012.
"Contracts between Legal Persons [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Kornhauser, Lewis A. & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," IZA Discussion Papers 5352, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," NBER Working Papers 16049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zhu, Tian, 2000. "Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 549-560, August.
More about this item
Keywords
Hold up; contrat à obligation d’exécution;Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02647357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.