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Généralisation de la complémentaire santé d’entreprise. Une évaluation ex-ante des gains et des pertes de bien-être

Author

Listed:
  • Aurélie Pierre

    (IRDES - Institut de Recherche et Documentation en Economie de la Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Florence Jusot

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, Legos - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Denis Raynaud

    (IRDES - Institut de Recherche et Documentation en Economie de la Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Carine Franc

    (CESP - Centre de recherche en épidémiologie et santé des populations - UVSQ - Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - AP-HP - Assistance publique - Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP) - Hôpital Paul Brousse - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale)

Abstract
The ANI reform mandates all private sector employers to offer sponsored Complementary Health Insurance (CHI) to all of their employees beginning on January 1st, 2016. This research simulates the likely effects of this mandate on the welfare of the population considering the Expected utility theory framework. The results show that the ANI reform may induce an increase in social welfare only if wages and CHI's premiums remain the same. Assuming that premiums of individual CHI contracts increase because of the new risks segmentation, the reform may hardly impact the social welfare. The gain in welfare that benefit private sector employees is therefore offset by the loss of welfare that suffer the individuals insured by an individual CHI contract or who chose to be uninsured before the reform. Considering in addition that employers will include their subsidy amount into wages, the reform may greatly reduce the social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélie Pierre & Florence Jusot & Denis Raynaud & Carine Franc, 2018. "Généralisation de la complémentaire santé d’entreprise. Une évaluation ex-ante des gains et des pertes de bien-être," Post-Print hal-02430997, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02430997
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.693.0407
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Or, Zeynep & Gandré, Coralie & Durand Zaleski, Isabelle & Steffen, Monika, 2022. "France's response to the Covid-19 pandemic: between a rock and a hard place," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 14-26, January.
    2. Christine Le Clainche & Pascale Lengagne, 2019. "The Effects of Mass Layoffs on Mental Health," Working Papers DT78, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised May 2019.
    3. Audrey Tanguy-Melac & Dorian Verboux & Laurence Pestel & Anne Fagot-Campagna & Philippe Tuppin & Christelle Gastaldi-Ménager, 2021. "Evolution of health care utilization and expenditure during the year before death in 2015 among people with cancer: French snds-based cohort study," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(7), pages 1039-1052, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Espérance d’utilité; Aversion au risque; Complémentaire santé;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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