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On Outsourced Abatement Services: Market Power and Efficient Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Sans

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sonia Schwartz

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Hubert Stahn

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
In this paper, we consider competitive polluting firms that outsource their abatement activity to an upstream imperfect competitive eco-industry to comply with environmental regulation. In this case, we show that an usual environmental policy based on a Pigouvian tax or a pollution permit market reaches the first-best outcome. The main intuition is based on the idea that purchasing pollution reduction services instead of pollution abatement inputs modifies for each potential tax rate (or out of the equilibrium permit price) the nature of the arbitrage between pollution and abatement. This induces a demand for abatement services which is, at least partially, strongly elastic and therefore strongly reduces upstream market power. This argument is first illustrated with an upstream monopoly selling eco-services to a representative polluting firm under a usual Pigouvian tax. We then progressively extend the result to permit markets, heterogeneous downstream polluters and heterogeneous upstream Cournot competitors. JEL Codes: Q58, D43

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Sans & Sonia Schwartz & Hubert Stahn, 2019. "On Outsourced Abatement Services: Market Power and Efficient Regulation," Post-Print hal-02477911, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02477911
    DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.136.0055
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02477911
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Qianqian & Sun, Xinmeng & Xiong, Haoyang & Wang, Qi & Zhang, Bing, 2024. "Environmental taxes, environmental outsourcing, and pollution abatement: Evidence from Chinese industrial sewage discharge enterprises," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Eco-industry; Imperfect Competition; Abatement Outsourcing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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