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Understanding Ransom Kidnappings and Their Duration

Author

Listed:
  • Claudio Detotto

    (LISA - Lieux, Identités, eSpaces, Activités - UPP - Université Pascal Paoli - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bryan Mccannon

    (Saint Bonaventure University)

  • Marco Vannini

    (UNISS - Università degli Studi di Sassari = University of Sassari [Sassari])

Abstract
What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. Policies aimed at deterring kidnapping have mixed effects on its duration.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Detotto & Bryan Mccannon & Marco Vannini, 2014. "Understanding Ransom Kidnappings and Their Duration," Post-Print hal-01972855, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01972855
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0079
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Reinhard Selten, 1976. "A Simple Game Model of Kidnapping," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 045, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. De Mello Joao M & Zilberman Eduardo, 2008. "Does Crime Affect Economic Decisions? An Empirical Investigation of Savings in a High-Crime Environment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, December.
    3. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
    4. Detotto, Claudio & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 63-67.
    5. Caroline Orset, 2008. "A Theory of Child Protection against Kidnapping," Cahiers de recherche 0816, CIRPEE.
    6. Bertrand Crettez & Régis Deloche, 2009. "A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 3(2), pages 123-139, June.
    7. Todd Sandler & John L. Scott, 1987. "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 35-53, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Porreca, Zachary, 2024. "Bride Kidnapping and Informal Governance Institutions," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1391, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Detotto, Claudio & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 63-67.
    3. Shaun Larcom & Mare Sarr, 2018. "On the Perils of Commitment to Punishment when Criminals Are Strategic," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 391-418.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime; kidnapping; ransom; Sardinia; survival analysis JEL Codes: C41; K42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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