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The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication

Author

Listed:
  • Jeanne Hagenbach

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Frédéric Koessler

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
This paper models the Streisand effect in a signaling game. A picture featuring a Star has been exogenously released. The Star privately knows whether the picture is embarrassing or neutral and can decide to censor it, with the aim of having it unseen. Receivers observe the Star's action and make efforts to see the picture, that depend on how embarrassing they expect it to be. Censorship reduces the Receivers' chances to see the picture but also serves as a motivating signal to search for it. When players are fully rational, we show that censorship cannot occur if the picture has little chances to be found when believed neutral. Next, we consider that players may not fully understand the signaling effect of censorship and study how it affects the equilibrium outcome. We model such partial sophistication of players using analogical reasoning à la Jehiel (2005). We explain that partially sophisticated Receivers are less responsive to the Star's action, which makes censorship more likely. We also show that a partially sophisticated Star can censor in equilibrium while it gives the picture higher chances to be found than without censorship. The Streisand effect is at play, in the sense that censorship creates interest which is unexpected by the Star.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Post-Print hal-01629301, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01629301
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
    2. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    4. Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "Cursed Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1623-1672, September.
    5. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5434 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Sébastien Liarte, 2013. "Brand image and Internet : Understanding, avoiding and managing the “Streisand” effect [Image de marque et internet : comprendre, éviter et gérer l'effet « Streisand »]," Post-Print hal-01369290, HAL.
    8. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
    9. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-1291, September.
    10. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ahçi, Mustafa, 2023. "Essays on corporate disclosures, innovation, and investments," Other publications TiSEM 0dddb5f7-17e1-41ba-97da-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 50-57.
    3. Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023. "The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analogy-based expectations; Signaling; Streisand effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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