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The incentive consequences of unemployment insurance
[L'indemnisation du chômage : au-delà d'une conception « désincitative »]

Author

Listed:
  • Yann Algan

    (IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics, UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Pierre Cahuc

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique [Bruz] - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz], IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Bruno Decreuse

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2)

  • Francois Fontaine

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics, Institut du travail de Strasbourg - Institut du travail de Strasbourg)

  • Solenne Tanguy

    (EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract
Unemployment compensation schemes have two goals: insuring against the risk of unemployment on the one hand, and financing job search on the other hand. During the past decades, the literature has mainly focused on the first goal, highlighting the moral hazard effects originated by unemployment benefits. However, several contributions, both empirical and theoretical, suggest unemployment compensation may also improve labour market efficiency, by alleviating the financial constraints that affect the job-seekers, helping to select the efficient search channel, or favoring the creation of high quality jobs. The present paper offers a synthesis of this literature in the paradigm of sequential job search theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & Bruno Decreuse & Francois Fontaine & Solenne Tanguy, 2006. "The incentive consequences of unemployment insurance [L'indemnisation du chômage : au-delà d'une conception « désincitative »]," Post-Print hal-00279392, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279392
    DOI: 10.3917/redp.163.0297
    as

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