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Engagement et incitations : comportements économiques sous serment

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Robert-Vincent Joule

    (LPS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)

  • Stephane Luchini

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Antoine Malézieux

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
Sous l'impulsion, notamment, de l'essor de l'économie expérimentale, la littérature récente a mis en évidence un large éventail de situations dans lesquelles les incitations monétaires échouent à orienter les comportements dans le sens désiré. Ce constat conduit à rechercher des mécanismes institutionnels alternatifs, capables de se substituer aux incitations monétaires. Cet article propose une revue des travaux s'inspirant de la psychologie sociale de l'engagement afin de développer des mécanismes non monétaires susceptibles d'affecter les comportements. Ces travaux étudient une procédure d'engagement particulière : un serment à dire la vérité. Cette procédure a été appliquée avec succès (1) au problème du biais hypothétique dans la révélation des préférences pour les biens non marchands, (2) aux défauts de coordination, et (3) à la propension à dire la vérité. Pris ensemble, ces travaux confirment la capacité de mécanismes d'engagement à guider l'élaboration d'institutions non monétaires capables d'orienter efficacement les comportements économiques.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malézieux, 2016. "Engagement et incitations : comportements économiques sous serment," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02084721, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-02084721
    DOI: 10.7202/1039880ar
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02084721
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