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Distribution Equilibrium I: definition and Examples

Author

Listed:
  • Sorin, S.
Abstract
In a 2-person Nash equilibrium any pure strategy is evaluated against the same mixed strategy of the opponent. The equilibrium condition says that all pure strategies used at equilibrium are best replies, hence they give the same payoff. We keep here the last two requirements (best reply and same payoff) but realx the first one (facing the same opponent's strategy) in the spirit of correlated distributions. We obtain a concept that has a natural interpretation in terms of equilibrium of populations: the various active genotypes have specific fitness and present also different norms of behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Sorin, S., 1998. "Distribution Equilibrium I: definition and Examples," Papers 9835, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9835
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    Cited by:

    1. Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat, 2004. "Games with espionage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 172-199, April.
    2. Yannick Viossat, 2003. "Properties of Dual Reduction," Working Papers hal-00242992, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ; GAME THEORY mathematiques et informatique; 200; avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 14p.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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