[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/gremaq/96.440.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Consumer Strategies Limiting The Monopolist's Power: Collusion And Multiple Purchase

Author

Listed:
  • Brundin, I.
Abstract
The classical price (quantity) discrimination model relies on the assumption that the consumers can neither buy more than one bundle each, nor resell the goods to each other. This assumption is lifted. In a two-type context, the consumers' set strategy is enlarged, first to allow for multiple purchase by one consumer, then to allow for collusion among consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Brundin, I., 1996. "Consumer Strategies Limiting The Monopolist's Power: Collusion And Multiple Purchase," Papers 96.440, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:96.440
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    MONOPOLIES;

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:96.440. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/getlsfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.