(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)"> (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)">
[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/cambri/167.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cooperation and Effective Computability

Author

Listed:
  • Anderlini, L.
  • Sabourian, H.
Abstract
A common interest game is a game in which there exists a unique pair of payoffs which strictly Pareto dominates all other payoffs. The authors consider the undiscounted repeated game obtained by the infinite repetition of such a two-player stage game. They show that, if supergame strategies are restricted to be computable within Church's thesis, the only pair of payoffs that survives any computable tremble with sufficiently large support is the Pareto-efficient pair. The result is driven by the ability of the players to use the early stages of the game to communicate their intention to play cooperatively in the future. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Anderlini, L. & Sabourian, H., 1991. "Cooperation and Effective Computability," Papers 167, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:167
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2016. "Bounded memory Folk Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 728-774.
    2. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 348-366, February.
    3. Anderlini, Luca, 1998. "Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 71-90, September.
    4. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
    6. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Guilfoos, Todd & Kurtz, Kenneth J., 2017. "Evaluating the role of personality trait information in social dilemmas," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 119-129.
    8. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 2001. "Cooperation and computability in n-player games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 99-137, September.
    9. Jones, Garett, 2008. "Are smarter groups more cooperative? Evidence from prisoner's dilemma experiments, 1959-2003," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 489-497, December.
    10. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
    11. William R. Zame & John H. Nachbar, 1996. "Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 103-122.
    12. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Tardos, Éva, 2015. "Introduction to computer science and economic theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.
    14. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    15. Amit Pazgal, 1995. "Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games," Discussion Papers 1126, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Markose, Sheri M., 2004. "Novelty in complex adaptive systems (CAS) dynamics: a computational theory of actor innovation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 344(1), pages 41-49.
    17. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández, 2003. "On the Complexity of Coordination," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 127-140, February.
    18. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2014. "Unpredictability of complex (pure) strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1-15.
    19. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2003. "Probabilistic representation of complexity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 49-87, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory ; economic models;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fecamuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.