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Testing Nash-bargaining household models with time-series data

Author

Listed:
  • Hoddinott, John
  • Adam, Christopher
Abstract
This paper uses a “natural experiment” in Canadian divorce law reform to discriminate empirically between unitary and Nash-bargained models of the household. Using time-series data from three Canadian provinces, it demonstrates that following landmark divorce law reforms in the 1970s—reforms that led to improvements in women's expected settlement upon divorce in Ontario and British Columbia, suicide rates for older, married women in these provinces registered a sharp decline. Similar declines were not registered for younger, unmarried women or men in Ontario and British Columbia, nor for older, married women in Quebec, where the legal basis for divorce did not change. These results are consistent with Nash-bargained models of the household but not with the unitary model.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoddinott, John & Adam, Christopher, 1998. "Testing Nash-bargaining household models with time-series data," FCND discussion papers 52, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    • Handle: RePEc:fpr:fcnddp:52
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    File URL: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/dp52.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Haddad, Lawrence & Oshaug, Arne, 1998. "How does the human rights perspective help to shape the food and nutrition policy research agenda?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 329-345, October.
    3. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Gutner, Tammi, 1999. "The political economy of Food subsidy reform in Egypt," FCND briefs 1, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    5. Michael Malcolm, 2012. "A noncooperative marriage model with remarriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 133-151, March.
    6. Mabsout, Ramzi & van Staveren, Irene, 2010. "Disentangling Bargaining Power from Individual and Household Level to Institutions: Evidence on Women's Position in Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 783-796, May.

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