[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedrwp/95889.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sovereign Debt and Credit Default Swaps

Author

Listed:
Abstract
ow do credit default swaps (CDS) affect sovereign debt markets? The answer depends crucially on trading frictions, risk-sharing, arbitrage violations, and spillovers from secondary to primary markets. We propose a sovereign default model where investors trade bonds and CDS over the counter via directed search. CDS affect bond prices through several channels. First, CDS act as a synthetic bond. Second, CDS reduce bond-investing risks, allowing exposure to be unwound. Third, CDS availability increases trading profitability, which induces entry and reduces trading costs. Last, these direct effects feedback into default decisions. Our novel identification strategy exploits confidential microdata to quantify the extent of trading frictions and risk-sharing. The model generates realistic CDS-bond basis deviations, bid/ask spreads, and CDS volumes and positions. Our baseline specification predicts large effects of frictions generally but small spillovers from a naked CDS ban. These predictions hinge crucially on the identified parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaston Chaumont & Grey Gordon & Bruno Sultanum & Elliot Tobin, 2023. "Sovereign Debt and Credit Default Swaps," Working Paper 23-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:95889
    DOI: 10.21144/wp23-05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/RichmondFedOrg/publications/research/working_papers/2023/wp23-05.pdf
    File Function: working paper
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.21144/wp23-05?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Duffie, D., 2010. "Is there a case for banning short speculation in sovereign bond markets?," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 14, pages 55-59, July.
    2. Ricardo Lagos & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2009. "Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 403-426, March.
    3. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2012. "Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2674-2699, October.
    4. Oehmke, Martin & Zawadowski, Adam, 2015. "Synthetic or real? The equilibrium effects of credit default swaps on bond markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84511, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Darrell Duffie, 2012. "Over-The-Counter Markets," Introductory Chapters, in: Dark Markets: Asset Pricing and Information Transmission in Over-the-Counter Markets, Princeton University Press.
    6. Engel, Charles & Bianchi, Javier & Bigio, Saki, 2021. "Scrambling for Dollars: International Liquidity, Banks and Exchange Rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 16712, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, 2007. "Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle Is the Trend," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(1), pages 69-102.
    8. Javier Bianchi & Saki Bigio, 2022. "Banks, Liquidity Management, and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 391-454, January.
    9. Zhiguo He & Konstantin Milbradt, 2014. "Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Bonds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1443-1508, July.
    10. Benjamin Lester & Guillaume Rocheteau & Pierre‐Olivier Weill, 2015. "Competing for Order Flow in OTC Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(S2), pages 77-126, June.
    11. Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
    12. Calice, Giovanni & Chen, Jing & Williams, Julian, 2013. "Liquidity spillovers in sovereign bond and CDS markets: An analysis of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 122-143.
    13. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    14. Salomao, Juliana, 2017. "Sovereign debt renegotiation and credit default swaps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 50-63.
    15. Pelizzon, Loriana & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tomio, Davide & Uno, Jun, 2016. "Sovereign credit risk, liquidity, and European Central Bank intervention: Deus ex machina?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 86-115.
    16. Martin Oehmke & Adam Zawadowski, 2015. "Synthetic or Real? The Equilibrium Effects of Credit Default Swaps on Bond Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(12), pages 3303-3337.
    17. Passadore, Juan & Xu, Yu, 2022. "Illiquidity in sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    18. Grey Gordon, 2019. "Efficient Computation with Taste Shocks," Working Paper 19-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    19. Batchimeg Sambalaibat, 2022. "A Theory of Liquidity Spillover between Bond and CDS Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 2525-2569.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaldorf, Matthias & Röttger, Joost, 2023. "Convenient but risky government bonds," Discussion Papers 15/2023, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2020. "The search theory of OTC markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 14847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Passadore, Juan & Xu, Yu, 2022. "Illiquidity in sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    4. Salomao, Juliana, 2017. "Sovereign debt renegotiation and credit default swaps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 50-63.
    5. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    6. Tavares, Tiago, 2019. "Labor market distortions under sovereign debt default crises," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    7. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & César Sosa-Padilla, 2016. "Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1383-1422.
    8. Javier Bianchi & Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, 2018. "International Reserves and Rollover Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2629-2670, September.
    9. Julien Hugonnier & Benjamin Lester & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2020. "Frictional Intermediation in Over-the-Counter Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1432-1469.
    10. Semih Üslü, 2019. "Pricing and Liquidity in Decentralized Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2079-2140, November.
    11. Conesa, Juan Carlos & Kehoe, Timothy J., 2024. "Preemptive austerity with rollover risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    12. Arce, Fernando, 2021. "Private Overborrowing under Sovereign Risk," MPRA Paper 113176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 244-273, October.
    14. Bulent Guler & Yasin Kursat Onder & Temel Taskin, 2022. "Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt Disclosure," CAEPR Working Papers 2022-004 Classification-E, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    15. Juan Hatchondo & Francisco Roch & Leonardo Martinez, 2019. "Constrained efficient borrowing with sovereign default risk," 2019 Meeting Papers 899, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Minetti, Raoul & Peng, Tao, 2013. "Lending constraints, real estate prices and business cycles in emerging economies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2397-2416.
    17. Lester, Benjamin & Shourideh, Ali & Venkateswaran, Venky & Zetlin-Jones, Ariel, 2023. "Market-making with search and information frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    18. Mihalache, Gabriel, 2020. "Sovereign default resolution through maturity extension," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    19. Bocola, Luigi & Bornstein, Gideon & Dovis, Alessandro, 2019. "Quantitative sovereign default models and the European debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 20-30.
    20. Gilchrist, Simon & Wei, Bin & Yue, Vivian Z. & Zakrajšek, Egon, 2022. "Sovereign risk and financial risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign debt; CDS; Directed search; Over-the-counter;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:95889. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Pascasio (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbrius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.