[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fednsr/524.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal disinflation under learning

Author

Abstract
Highly volatile transition dynamics can emerge when a central bank disinflates while operating without full transparency. In our model, a central bank commits to a Taylor rule whose form is known but whose coefficients are not. Private agents learn about policy parameters via Bayesian updating. Under McCallum?s (1999) timing protocol, temporarily explosive dynamics can arise, making the transition highly volatile. Locally unstable dynamics emerge when there is substantial disagreement between actual and perceived feedback parameters. The central bank can achieve low average inflation, but its ability to adjust reaction coefficients is more limited.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Cogley & Christian Matthes & Argia M. Sbordone, 2011. "Optimal disinflation under learning," Staff Reports 524, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:524
    Note: For a published version of this report, see Timothy Cogley, Christian Matthes, and Argia M. Sbordone, "Optimal Disinflation under Learning," Review of Economic Studies 82, no. 2 (April 2015): 791-824.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr524.html
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr524.pdf
    File Function: Appendix(es)
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr524_appendix.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J., 1989. "Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-368, August.
    2. Justiniano, Alejandro & Primiceri, Giorgio E. & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2010. "Investment shocks and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 132-145, March.
    3. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2006. "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules: Expanded Version," NBER Working Papers 12402, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2011. "Monetary Policy, Trend Inflation, and the Great Moderation: An Alternative Interpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 341-370, February.
    5. Elmar Mertens, 2016. "Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 661-698, June.
    6. Guido Ascari, 2004. "Staggered Prices and Trend Inflation: Some Nuisances," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(3), pages 642-667, July.
    7. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 67(s1), pages 1-35.
    8. Timothy Cogley & Thomas J. Sargent, 2005. "Drift and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post WWII U.S," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 262-302, April.
    9. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    10. McCallum, Bennett T., 1999. "Issues in the design of monetary policy rules," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1483-1530, Elsevier.
    11. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(4), pages 807-824.
    12. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2007. "Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 1702-1725, September.
    13. Elmar Mertens, 2010. "Discreet Commitments and Discretion of Policymakers with Private Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 763, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Giorgio E. Primiceri, 2005. "Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 821-852.
    15. Milani, Fabio, 2007. "Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 2065-2082, October.
    16. Marimon, Ramon & Scott, Andrew (ed.), 1999. "Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198294979.
    17. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 1998. "Economic Dynamics with Learning: New Stability Results," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 23-44.
    18. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J, 1989. "Convergence of Least-Squares Learning in Environments with Hidden State Variables and Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1306-1322, December.
    19. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2007. "Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 1406-1435, July.
    20. Vitor Gaspar & Frank Smets & David Vestin, 2006. "Adaptive Learning, Persistence, and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 376-385, 04-05.
    21. In-Koo Cho & Noah Williams & Thomas J. Sargent, 2002. "Escaping Nash Inflation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 1-40.
    22. Timothy Cogley & Giorgio E. Primiceri & Thomas J. Sargent, 2010. "Inflation-Gap Persistence in the US," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 43-69, January.
    23. repec:bla:manchs:v:67:y:1999:i:0:p:1-35 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Jacobs,Donald P. & Kalai,Ehud & Kamien,Morton I. & Schwartz,Nancy L. (ed.), 1998. "Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521635387, September.
    25. Guthrie, Graeme & Wright, Julian, 2000. "Open mouth operations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 489-516, October.
    26. Robert J. Gordon, 1982. "Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly: Evidence from Fourteen Historical Episodes," NBER Chapters, in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 11-40, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1.
    28. Timothy Cogley & Thomas J. Sargent, 2008. "Anticipated Utility And Rational Expectations As Approximations Of Bayesian Decision Making," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(1), pages 185-221, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Amir Ahmadi, Pooyan & Matthes, Christian & Wang, Mu-Chun, 2014. "Drifts, Volatilities and Impulse Responses Over the Last Century," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100562, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Ascari, Guido & Florio, Anna & Gobbi, Alessandro, 2017. "Transparency, expectations anchoring and inflation target," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 261-273.
    3. Christian Matthes & Francesca Rondina, 2012. "Two-sided Learning in New Keynesian Models: Dynamics, (Lack of) Convergence and the Value of Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 913.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Francesco Bianchi & Leonardo Melosi, 2018. "Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 187-202, March.
    5. Giamattei, Marcus, 2015. "Cold Turkey vs. Gradualism - Evidence on Disinflation Strategies from a Laboratory Experiment," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-67-15, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    6. Yang Lu & Ernesto Pasten & Robert King, 2013. "Policy design with private sector skepticism in the textbook New Keynesian model," 2013 Meeting Papers 241, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Francesco Bianchi & Leonardo Melosi, 2016. "Modeling The Evolution Of Expectations And Uncertainty In General Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 717-756, May.
    8. Leonardo Melosi & Francesco Bianchi, 2012. "Inflationary Sentiments and Monetary Policy Communcation," 2012 Meeting Papers 893, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Matthes, Christian & Rondina, Francesca, 2017. "Two-sided learning and short-run dynamics in a New Keynesian model of the economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 53-56.
    10. Hollmayr, Josef & Matthes, Christian, 2015. "Learning about fiscal policy and the effects of policy uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 142-162.
    11. Ascari, Guido & Ropele, Tiziano, 2013. "Disinflation effects in a medium-scale New Keynesian model: Money supply rule versus interest rate rule," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 77-100.
    12. Lubik, Thomas A. & Matthes, Christian, 2016. "Indeterminacy and learning: An analysis of monetary policy in the Great Inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 85-106.
    13. Leonardo Melosi, 2017. "Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 853-884.
    14. Alina Barnett & Martin Ellison, 2013. "Learning by Disinflating," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 731-746, June.
    15. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2012_010 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Guido Ascari & Argia M. Sbordone, 2014. "The Macroeconomics of Trend Inflation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(3), pages 679-739, September.
    17. Alina Barnett & Martin Ellison, 2013. "Learning by Disinflating," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 731-746, June.
    18. Hollmayr, Josef & Matthes, Christian, 2014. "Dynamics of Monetary-Fiscal Interaction under Learning," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100609, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Christian Matthes, 2015. "Figuring Out the Fed—Beliefs about Policymakers and Gains from Transparency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 1-29, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cogley, Timothy & Matthes, Christian & Sbordone, Argia M., 2015. "Optimized Taylor rules for disinflation when agents are learning," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 131-147.
    2. Gáti, Laura, 2023. "Monetary policy & anchored expectations—An endogenous gain learning model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(S), pages 37-47.
    3. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2009. "Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 2, pages 027-076, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Molnár, Krisztina & Santoro, Sergio, 2014. "Optimal monetary policy when agents are learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 39-62.
    5. Guido Ascari & Argia M. Sbordone, 2014. "The Macroeconomics of Trend Inflation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(3), pages 679-739, September.
    6. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2009. "Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 2, pages 027-076, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2008. "Stabilizing Expectations under Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination," NBER Working Papers 14391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Francesco Bianchi & Leonardo Melosi, 2018. "Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 187-202, March.
    9. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2007_032 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September.
    11. Carlos Carvalho & Stefano Eusepi & Emanuel Moench & Bruce Preston, 2023. "Anchored Inflation Expectations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 1-47, January.
    12. Guido Ascari & Paolo Bonomolo & Qazi Haque, 2023. "The Long-Run Phillips Curve is ... a Curve," Working Papers 789, DNB.
    13. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2011. "Monetary Policy, Trend Inflation, and the Great Moderation: An Alternative Interpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 341-370, February.
    14. James Bullard & Kaushik Mitra, 2007. "Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 1177-1212, August.
    15. Hommes, Cars & Lustenhouwer, Joep, 2019. "Inflation targeting and liquidity traps under endogenous credibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 48-62.
    16. Mele, Antonio & Molnár, Krisztina & Santoro, Sergio, 2020. "On the perils of stabilizing prices when agents are learning," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 339-353.
    17. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2009. "Robust Learning Stability with Operational Monetary Policy Rules," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 5, pages 145-170, Central Bank of Chile.
    18. Carrillo, Julio A. & Peersman, Gert & Wauters, Joris, 2022. "Endogenous wage indexation and aggregate shocks," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    19. James Bullard & Stefano Eusepi, 2014. "When Does Determinacy Imply Expectational Stability?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(1), pages 1-22, February.
    20. Gasteiger, Emanuel, 2021. "Optimal constrained interest-rate rules under heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 287-325.
    21. Man-Keung Tang & Mr. Xiangrong Yu, 2011. "Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics," IMF Working Papers 2011/209, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation; monetary policy; learning; policy reforms; transitions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:524. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gabriella Bucciarelli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.