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Franchise value, ownership structure, and risk at savings institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Elijah Brewer
  • Marc R. Saidenberg
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between asset risk and franchise values and between asset risk and ownership structure. Stock price data from publicly traded S&L is used to measure portfolio risk and franchise or charter values. The empirical results provide support for the moral hazard hypothesis. The standard deviation of equity returns is negatively related to S&L franchise values, as measured by the market-to-book asset ratio. This research also finds empirical support for models of managerial entrenchment in the thrift industry. We find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between risk and insider control. The standard deviation of equity returns initially falls then rises as ownership is concentrated in the hands of officers and directors.

Suggested Citation

  • Elijah Brewer & Marc R. Saidenberg, 1996. "Franchise value, ownership structure, and risk at savings institutions," Research Paper 9632, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednrp:9632
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Gorton, Gary & Rosen, Richard, 1995. "Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1377-1420, December.
    4. Saunders, Anthony & Strock, Elizabeth & Travlos, Nickolaos G, 1990. "Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 643-654, June.
    5. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    6. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 227-245, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Demian Macedo & Victor Troster, 2021. "Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 705-746, October.
    2. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Staff Reports 29, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    3. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Research Paper 9709, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Francesco Marchionne & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Rischio e concorrenza nel sistema bancario italiano durante la crisi finanziaria globale," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 86, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    5. Downing, Jeff, 2019. "Accounting standards and banking regulation: Some effects of divergence," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 386-397.
    6. Kenneth Spong & Richard J. Sullivan, 1998. "How does ownership structure and manager wealth influence risk? : a look at ownership structure, manager wealth, and risk in commercial banks," Financial Industry Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Dec, pages 15-40.

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