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Avoiding Sovereign Default Contagion: A Normative Analysis

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Abstract
Should debtor countries support each other during sovereign debt crises? We answer this question through the lens of a two-country sovereign-default model that we calibrate to the euro-area periphery. First, we look at cross-country bailouts. We find that whenever agents anticipate their existence, bailouts induce moral hazard an reduce welfare. Second, we look at the borrowing choices of a global central borrower. We find that it borrows less than individual governments and, as such, defaults become less frequent and welfare increases. Finally, we show that central borrower's policies can be replicated in a decentralized setting with Pigouvian taxes on debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio De Ferra & Enrico Mallucci, 2020. "Avoiding Sovereign Default Contagion: A Normative Analysis," International Finance Discussion Papers 1275, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1275
    DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2020.1275
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    1. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 244-273, October.
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    15. Demian Pouzo & Ignacio Presno, 2016. "Sovereign Default Risk and Uncertainty Premia," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 230-266, July.
    16. Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Sandra Lizarazo, 2017. "Sovereign Risk Contagion," NBER Working Papers 24031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Sergio de Ferra, 0. "External Imbalances, Gross Capital Flows, and Sovereign Debt Crises," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 347-402.
    18. Kristin Forbes, 2012. "The "Big C": Identifying Contagion," NBER Working Papers 18465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Albert S. Kyle & Wei Xiong, 2001. "Contagion as a Wealth Effect," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1401-1440, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sewon Hur & César Sosa-Padilla & Zeynep Yom, 2021. "Optimal bailouts in banking and sovereign crises," Working Papers 51, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    2. Giancarlo Corsetti & Aitor Erce & Timothy Uy, 2020. "Official sector lending during the euro area crisis," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 667-705, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign default; Sovereign contagion; Bailouts; Pigouvian taxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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