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An Economic Approach to Alleviate the Crisis of Confidence in Science: With an Application to the Public Goods Game

Author

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  • Luigi Butera
  • John List
Abstract
Novel empirical insights by their very nature tend to be unanticipated, and in some cases at odds with the current state of knowledge on the topic. The mechanics of statistical inference suggest that such initial findings, even when robust and statistically significant within the study, should not appreciably move priors about the phenomenon under investigation. Yet, a few well-conceived independent replications dramatically improve the reliability of novel findings. Nevertheless, the incentives to replicate are seldom in place in the sciences, especially within the social sciences. We propose a simple incentive-compatible mechanism to promote replications, and use experimental economics to highlight our approach. We begin by reporting results from an experiment in which we investigate how cooperation in allocation games is affected by the presence of Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity), a pervasive and yet unexplored characteristic of most public goods. Unexpectedly, we find that adding uncertainty enhances cooperation. This surprising result serves as a test case for our mechanism: instead of sending this paper to a peer-reviewed journal, we make it available online as a working paper, but we commit never to submit it to a journal for publication. We instead offered co-authorship for a second, yet to be written, paper to other scholars willing to independently replicate our study. That second paper will reference this working paper, will include all replications, and will be submitted to a peer- reviewed journal for publication. Our mechanism allows mutually-beneficial gains from trade between the original investigators and other scholars, alleviates the publication bias problem that often surrounds novel experimental results, and accelerates the advancement of economic science by leveraging the mechanics of statistical inference.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Butera & John List, 2017. "An Economic Approach to Alleviate the Crisis of Confidence in Science: With an Application to the Public Goods Game," Artefactual Field Experiments 00608, The Field Experiments Website.
    • Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:00608
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      by Tyler Cowen in Marginal Revolution on 2017-04-19 20:48:19
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      by ? in Dynamic Ecology on 2017-04-21 16:00:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Takeuchi, Ai & Seki, Erika, 2023. "Coordination and free-riding problems in the provision of multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 95-121.
    2. Luigi Butera & Philip Grossman & Daniel Houser & John List & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2020. "A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science - With an Application to the Public Goods Game," Artefactual Field Experiments 00684, The Field Experiments Website.
    3. Bulte, Erwin & Di Falco, Salvatore & Lensink, Robert, 2020. "Randomized interventions and “real” treatment effects: A cautionary tale and an example," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Omar Al-Ubaydli & John List & Claire Mackevicius & Min Sok Lee & Dana Suskind, 2019. "How Can Experiments Play a Greater Role in Public Policy? 12 Proposals from an Economic Model of Scaling," Artefactual Field Experiments 00679, The Field Experiments Website.
    5. Igor Asanov & Christoph Buehren & Panagiota Zacharodimou, 2020. "The power of experiments: How big is your n?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202032, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    6. John A. List, 2024. "Optimally generate policy-based evidence before scaling," Nature, Nature, vol. 626(7999), pages 491-499, February.
    7. Luigi Butera & Philip J Grossman & Daniel Houser & John A List & Marie Claire Villeval, 2020. "A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods GameA Review," Working Papers halshs-02512932, HAL.
    8. Hou, Kewei & Xue, Chen & Zhang, Lu, 2017. "Replicating Anomalies," Working Paper Series 2017-10, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    9. Schöller, Vanessa & Ulmer, Clara, 2023. "Can monetized carbon information increase pro-environmental behavior? Experimental evidence," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    10. Eszter Czibor & David Jimenez‐Gomez & John A. List, 2019. "The Dozen Things Experimental Economists Should Do (More of)," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 371-432, October.
    11. Billur Aksoy & Silvana Krasteva, 2020. "When does less information translate into more giving to public goods?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1148-1177, December.
    12. Demiral, Elif E. & Mollerstrom, Johanna, 2020. "The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 341-352.
    13. Allan Drazen & Anna Dreber & Erkut Y. Ozbay & Erik Snowberg, 2019. "A Journal-Based Replication of "Being Chosen to Lead"," CESifo Working Paper Series 7942, CESifo.
    14. Caleb A. Cox & Brock Stoddard, 2021. "Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 343-369, May.
    15. Davide Pace & Joël van der Weele, 2020. "Curbing Carbon: An Experiment on Uncertainty and Information about CO2 emissions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-059/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    16. Ding, Shuze & Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Tucker, Steven & Williams, Arlington, 2018. "Cash versus extra-credit incentives in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 19-27.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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