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Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Marita Laukkanen

    (MTT Economic Research)

Abstract
This paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary co-operation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing co-operative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-co-operative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Marita Laukkanen, 2003. "Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty," Working Papers 2003.118, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.118
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clark, Colin W, 1973. "Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 950-961, July-Aug..
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    5. Laukkanen, Marita, 2003. "Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 454-473, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fisheries management; Transboundary fisheries; Non-cooperative games; Implementation uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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