[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/20764.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Banks, firms, bad debts and bankruptcy in Hungary 1991-4

Author

Listed:
  • Bonin, J. P.
  • Schaffer, M. E.
Abstract
The paper examines Hungary''s experience with banking and bankruptcy reform in the period 1992-94. The first part of the paper uses enterprise-level data to show that in 1992, the same year in which the amount of classified loans in the state-owned commercial banks grew enormously, the proportion of total bank credit held by highly-unprofitable firms hardly changed. The inference from this is that the rapid growth of bad debt in 1992 was not the result of a "flow problem" (new bad lending) but rather represented the emergence of an inherited "stock problem" (pre-existing loans to inherited troubled clients). The paper then considers Hungary''s 1992 bankruptcy reform, and in particular the novel "automatic trigger" which required firms to file for bankruptcy if they had a payable of any size, owed to anybody, overdue 90 days or more. The paper argues that the bankruptcy experiment was flawed on two counts. First, one of the key motivations for introducing the automatic trigger - a perceived problem with financial discipline and with interenterprise credit in particular - was largely unfounded. Second, the automatic trigger experiment was costly because the impact on firms which were forced to file for bankruptcy led to chains of disrupted trade relations which rippled through the economy. Evidence from a 1994 survey of 200 manufacturing firms shows that a majority of the surveyed firms had been involved in bankruptcies as creditors, and had lost not only sales but also suppliers as a result. The last part of the paper looks at the Hungarian government''s bank recapitalization and enterprise bailout programs, arguing that they were poorly structured, overly bureaucratic, and susceptible to lobbying by firms looking to be "rescued". The paper concludes with a number of lessons: don''t "shake things up" without being sure of the possible consequences; don''t overestimate the capacities of bureaucratic procedures and undeveloped asset markets when designing debt workout programs; and don''t underestimate the ability of market agents (banks and firms) to enforce financial discipline on each other if incentives are properly structured.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonin, J. P. & Schaffer, M. E., 1995. "Banks, firms, bad debts and bankruptcy in Hungary 1991-4," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20764, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:20764
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20764/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John P. Bonin & István P. Székely (ed.), 1994. "The Development and Reform of Financial Systems in Central and Eastern Europe," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 55.
    2. Baer, Herbert L. & Gray, Cheryl W., 1995. "Debt as a control device in transitional economies : the experiences of Hungary and Poland," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1480, The World Bank.
    3. János Kornai, 1993. "The Evolution of Financial Discipline under the Postsocialist System," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 315-336, August.
    4. repec:bla:kyklos:v:46:y:1993:i:3:p:315-36 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Qimiao Fan & Mark E. Schaffer, 1994. "Government financial transfers and enterprise adjustments in Russia, with comparisons to Central and Eastern Europe," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(2), pages 151-188, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard, 2022. "A puha költségvetési korlát - I [The soft budget constraint I]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 75-93.
    2. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, March.
    3. Dittus, Peter, 1996. "Why East European banks don't want equity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 655-662, April.
    4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6926 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
    6. Rumen Dobrinsky, 1996. "Enterprise restructuring and adjustment in the transition to market economy: lessons from the experience of Central and Eastern Europe," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(2), pages 389-410, October.
    7. Céline Bignebat & Fabian Gouret, 2008. "Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraints. An empirical analysis using enterprise-level data in transition countries," Post-Print halshs-00308719, HAL.
    8. Schaffer, Mark E., 1998. "Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 80-103, March.
    9. Céline Bignebat & Fabian Gouret, 2008. "Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraints An empirical analysis using enterprise‐level data in transition countries1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 16(3), pages 503-535, July.
    10. Shumei Gao and Mark E. Schaffer & Shumei Gao and Mark E. Schaffer, 1998. "Financial Discipline in the Enterprise Sector in Transition Countries: How Does China Compare?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 124, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    11. J. Gacs, 2000. "Macroeconomic Developments in Hungary and the Accession Process," Working Papers ir00013, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    12. Miklos Szanyi, 2002. "Bankruptcy regulations, policy credibility and asset transfers in Hungary," IWE Working Papers 130, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6926 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Brada, Josef C. & Kutan, Ali M., 1999. "The end of moderate inflation in three transition economies?," ZEI Working Papers B 21-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    15. Jérôme Sgard, 2001. "Direct Foreign Investments and Productivity Growth in Hungarian Firms, 1992-1999," Working Papers hal-01065013, HAL.
    16. Ernesto Crivelli, 2012. "Local Governments’ Fiscal Balance, Privatization, and Banking Sector Reform in Transition Countries," IMF Working Papers 2012/146, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Ábel, István & Szakadát, László, 1995. "Csőd a piacgazdasági átmenetben [The failure of transition to market economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 942-954.
    18. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6926 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland, 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 11.
    20. Kornai, János, 2000. "A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban [Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-22.
    21. Emilio Colombo, 2001. "Determinants of corporate capital structure: evidence from Hungarian firms," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(13), pages 1689-1701.
    22. Elisabetta Bertero, 1997. "Restructuring financial systems in transition and developing economies: an approach based on the French financial system," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 5(2), pages 367-393, November.
    23. Baer, Herbert L. & Gray, Cheryl W., 1995. "Debt as a control device in transitional economies : the experiences of Hungary and Poland," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1480, The World Bank.
    24. Debora Revoltella & Peter R. Haiss & Gerhard Fink, 1998. "Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe - Transition management is a tough job," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 3 edited by Morten Balling, May.
    25. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6926 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Judy Day & Peter Taylor, 2004. "Institutional Change and Debt-based Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis of Four Transition Economies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 8(1), pages 73-115, March.
    2. Anderson, James H. & Korsun, Georges & Murrell, Peter, 2000. "Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effects of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 219-246, June.
    3. Bonin, John P. & Schaffer, Mark E., 1996. "Bankok, vállalatok, rossz hitelek és csődök Magyarországon, 1991-1994 [Banks, firms, bad debts and bankruptcies in Hungary, 1991-1994]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 93-113.
    4. Debora Revoltella & Peter R. Haiss & Gerhard Fink, 1998. "Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe - Transition management is a tough job," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 3 edited by Morten Balling, May.
    5. Lücke, Matthias, 1994. "Beschäftigungsstruktur und realwirtschaftliche Anpassung in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1614, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Park, Albert & Sehrt, Kaja, 2001. "Tests of Financial Intermediation and Banking Reform in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 608-644, December.
    7. Budina, Nina & Garretsen, Harry & Jong, Eelke de, 1999. "Liquidity constraints and investment in transition economies : the case of Bulgaria," Research Report 00E05, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    8. Hochreiter, Eduard & Rovelli, Riccardo & Winckler, Georg, 1996. "Central banks and seigniorage: A study of three economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 629-643, April.
    9. repec:dgr:rugsom:00e05 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Athanasios Papadopoulos & Giuseppe Diana & Moise Sidiropoulos, 2005. "Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 58, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    11. Sjöholm, Fredrik, 2006. "State Owned Enterprises And Equitization In Vietnam," EIJS Working Paper Series 228, Stockholm School of Economics, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
    12. M. Busse, 1994. "Restructuring and Recovery of Output in Russia," Working Papers wp94090, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    13. Wang, Qian & Wong, T.J. & Xia, Lijun, 2008. "State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 112-134, September.
    14. Clarke, George R G & Cull, Robert, 2002. "Political and Economic Determinants of the Likelihood of Privatizing Argentine Public Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 165-197, April.
    15. Klarita Gërxhani, 2004. "The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(3_4), pages 267-300, September.
    16. Mathilde Maurel & Thomas Pernet, 2021. "New evidence on the soft budget constraint: Chinese environmental policy effectiveness in SOE-dominated cities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 111-142, April.
    17. Hasan, Iftekhar & Marton, Katherin, 2003. "Development and efficiency of the banking sector in a transitional economy: Hungarian experience," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 2249-2271, December.
    18. Trien Le & Amon Chizema, 2011. "State ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese listed firms," Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies, Faculty of Economics, Vilnius University, vol. 2(2).
    19. Mathilde Maurel & Thomas Pernet-Coudrier, 2020. "New Evidence on the Soft Budget Constraint: Chinese Environmental Policy Effectiveness in Private versus SOEs," Post-Print halshs-02469382, HAL.
    20. Jérôme Sgard, 1995. "Ajustement des entreprises et distribution du crédit pendant la transition," Post-Print hal-03585825, HAL.
    21. Maria Lacko, 1999. "Do Power Consumption Data Tell the Story? - Electricity Intensity and Hidden Economy in Post-Socialist Countries," Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 9902, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:20764. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.