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The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment

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  • Belot, Michele
  • Schroeder, Marina
Abstract
We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.

Suggested Citation

  • Belot, Michele & Schroeder, Marina, 2013. "The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-110, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:535
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    Cited by:

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    2. Fabio Galeotti & Valeria Maggian & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(638), pages 2508-2528.
    3. Burdin, Gabriel & Dughera, Stefano & Landini, Fabio & Belloc, Filippo, 2023. "Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1340, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    4. Manthei, Kathrin & Sliwka, Dirk & Vogelsang, Timo, 2019. "Talking about Performance or Paying for it? Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 12446, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2024. "Adverse effects of control? Evidence from a field experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 469-488, April.
    6. Francesca Gioia, 2019. "Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(4), pages 473-495, November.
    7. Gneezy, Uri & Nelidov, Vadim & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2023. "When opportunities backfire: Alternatives reduce perseverance and success in task completion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 304-324.
    8. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2021. "Adverse Effects of Contol: Evidence from a Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 8890, CESifo.
    9. Kathrin Manthei & Dirk Sliwka & Timo Vogelsang, 2023. "Talking About Performance or Paying for It? A Field Experiment on Performance Reviews and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2198-2216, April.
    10. Silvia Angerer & Daniela Glätzle‐Rützler & Christian Waibel, 2021. "Monitoring institutions in healthcare markets: Experimental evidence," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 951-971, May.
    11. Eszter Czibor & Danny Hsu & David Jimenez-Gomez & Susanne Neckermann & Burcu Subasi, 2022. "Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7518-7537, October.
    12. Florian Engl & Arno Riedl & Roberto Weber, 2021. "Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 261-299, November.
    13. Gioia Francesca, 2024. "Incentive-Induced Social Tie and Subsequent Altruism and Cooperation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 24(3), pages 751-797.
    14. Michalis Drouvelis & Johannes Jarke-Neuert & Johannes Lohse, 2021. "Should transparency be (in-)transparent? On monitoring aversion and cooperation in teams," Papers 2112.12621, arXiv.org.
    15. Alessandro De Chiara & Florian Engl & Holger Herz & Ester Manna, 2022. "Control Aversion in Hierarchies," CESifo Working Paper Series 9779, CESifo.
    16. Ishizaka, Alessio & Siraj, Sajid, 2018. "Are multi-criteria decision-making tools useful? An experimental comparative study of three methods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(2), pages 462-471.
    17. Brandts, Jordi & Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Ortiz, José Mª & Solà, Carles, 2021. "Watching or not watching? Access to information and the incentive effects of firing threats," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 672-685.
    18. Kayas, Oliver G., 2023. "Workplace surveillance: A systematic review, integrative framework, and research agenda," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    19. Vranka, Marek & Frollová, Nikola & Pour, Marek & Novakova, Julie & Houdek, Petr, 2019. "Cheating customers in grocery stores: A field study on dishonesty," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    counterproductive behaviour; monitoring; experimentment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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