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Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroshi Kitamura
  • Noriaki Matsushima
  • Misato Sato
Abstract
This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new upstream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2016. "Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power," ISER Discussion Paper 0978, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0978
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    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0978.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Lars Persson, 2009. "On The Anticompetitive Effect Of Exclusive Dealing When Entry By Merger Is Possible," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 785-811, December.
    2. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Thomas Rønde, 2012. "Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 599-608, December.
    3. Abito, Jose Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2008. "Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 227-246, January.
    4. Farrell, Joseph, 2005. "Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9wv3k43c, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    5. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2145-2220, Elsevier.
    6. Yong, Jong-Say, 1996. "Excluding Capacity-Constrained Entrants through Exclusive Dealing: Theory and an Application to Ocean Shipping," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 115-129, June.
    7. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2024. "How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(2), pages 219-242, March.
    8. Michael D. Whinston & Ilya R. Segal, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March.
    9. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-1145, December.
    10. John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2007. "Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1305-1320, September.
    11. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    12. Aghadadashli, Hamid & Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2016. "The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 291-294.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhong, Feimin & Zhou, Zhongbao & Leng, Mingming, 2021. "Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(3), pages 1096-1107.
    2. Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018. "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 145-167.
    3. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2024. "How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(2), pages 219-242, March.
    4. Lin, Yen-Ju, 2022. "Consumer welfare, licensing, and exclusive dealing with vertically- and horizontally-differentiated products," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-158.
    5. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2021. "Lease or sale: When a durable goods monopolist can choose supply chain's openness," ISER Discussion Paper 1127, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    6. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2023. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 158-176, January.
    7. Chul-Hi Park & Toshihiro Matsumura & Sang-Ho Lee, 2022. "Procurement of advanced inputs and welfare-reducing vertical integration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 255-283, April.
    8. Muhammad Zeeshan Shaukat & Madiha Saleem & Muhammad Usman Ajmal Mirza & Abdul Basit & Abdul Aziz Khan Niazi, 2023. "Using Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) to Impose Hierarchy on Critical Issues of Contractual Bargaining: A Study of Construction Industry of Pakistan," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 9(3), pages 69-84.
    9. Marcella Scrimitore, 2019. "Endogenizing managerial delegation: A new result under Nash bargaining and network effects," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2019/15, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    10. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2021. "Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 471-478, December.
    11. Lee, Sang-Ho & Matsumura, Toshihiro & Park, Chul-Hi, 2017. "Procurement of Advanced Technology and Welfare-Reducing Vertical Integration," MPRA Paper 79109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2021. "Defending home against giants: Exclusive dealing as a survival strategy for local firms," ISER Discussion Paper 1122, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2018. "Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition," ISER Discussion Paper 1021, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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