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How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes

Author

Listed:
  • Burton A. Abrams

    (Department of Economics,University of Delaware)

Abstract
Evidence from the Nixon tapes, now available to researchers, shows that President Richard Nixon pressured the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns, to engage in expansionary monetary policies in the run up to the 1972 election. This paper quotes the relevant conversations from the Nixon tapes. Questions remain as to whether Burns followed an expansionary policy in an already-inflationary environment out of conviction or because of political pressure.

Suggested Citation

  • Burton A. Abrams, 2006. "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes," Working Papers 06-04, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:dlw:wpaper:06-04
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Price, Simon, 1997. "Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 407-427, September.
    2. Burton Abrams & Plamen Iossifov, 2006. "Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 249-262, December.
    3. Leertouwer, Erik & Maier, Philipp, 2001. "Who creates political business cycles: should central banks be blamed?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 445-463, September.
    4. Allen, Stuart D. & McCrickard, Donald L., 1991. "The influence of elections on federal reserve behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 51-55, September.
    5. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2004. "Choosing the Federal Reserve Chair: Lessons from History," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 129-162, Winter.
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