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Individual Motivation, its Nature, Determinants and Consequences for Within Group Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Alkire, Sabina

    (World Bank, Poverty Group)

  • Deneulin, Séverine

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); Oxford University, International Development Centre)

Abstract
The paper deals with evaluating the adequacy of the assumption that in economic transactions people are self-interested insofar as they are motivated solely by the concern of maximizing their own utility, and in particular with assessing how this assumption affects within-group behavior. Policy and incentive structures based on the assumption of exogenous and self-interested motivation can undermine other sources of motivation and have negative effects both on cooperative behavior and also on economic efficiency. The paper sketches the motivational assumption of homo œconomicus: in the classical formulation, in rational choice theory and in Becker’s later work which introduces personal and social capital into the individual utility function. It then challenges the position that homo œconomicus contains an adequate characterization of human motivation for cooperative within-group behavior. It introduces alternative motivational behaviors: philia and altruism, identity and self-expression, moral rules, intrinsic motivation and social norms. It argues that motivations are complex and multiple; a single assumption of utility maximization is insufficient for policy purposes. As the individual is always a social being, how she behaves will be dependent on the social context in which she is acting. If motivations are endogenous, and if under certain conditions maximizing motivation displaces other sources of motivation, then these indirect effects, and their long term consequences for efficiency and equity, should be taken into account in framing economic policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Alkire, Sabina & Deneulin, Séverine, 1998. "Individual Motivation, its Nature, Determinants and Consequences for Within Group Behavior," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999033
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9933.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
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    7. Sen, Amartya, 1985. "Goals, Commitment, and Identity," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 341-355, Fall.
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    10. Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
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    12. Sen, Amartya, 1997. "Economics, Business Principles and Moral Sentiments," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 5-15, July.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Emmanuel Atiisipae Akolgo & Desmond Tutu Ayentimi, 2020. "Community-level mechanisms and strategies for managing sustainable water supply systems: lessons from Bongo district of northern Ghana," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 3739-3756, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Motivation; Rational Choice; Self-Interest; Cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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