[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvec/2008024.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

Author

Listed:
  • David, DE LA CROIX

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

  • Clara, DELAVALLADE
Abstract
We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters : the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and incime growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and politiccal institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions respectively are limited.

Suggested Citation

  • David, DE LA CROIX & Clara, DELAVALLADE, 2008. "Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2008024, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2008-24.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Docquier, Frederic & Tarbalouti, Essaid, 2001. "Bribing Votes: A New Explanation to the "Inequality-Redistribution" Puzzle in LDCs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 259-272, September.
    2. Cuong Le Van & Mathilde Maurel, 2006. "Education, corruption and growth in developing countries," Post-Print halshs-00129754, HAL.
    3. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617.
    4. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    6. Theo Eicher & Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2009. "Education, Corruption and Constitutional Reform," Working Papers UWEC-2007-17-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    7. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003. "Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
    8. Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006. "Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, August.
    9. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Stock, James H & Wright, Jonathan H & Yogo, Motohiro, 2002. "A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(4), pages 518-529, October.
    11. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 270-293, December.
    12. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    13. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," Macroeconomics 0308006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    15. McKenzie, Lionel W., 2005. "Optimal economic growth, turnpike theorems and comparative dynamics," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 26, pages 1281-1355, Elsevier.
    16. Mr. Carlos A Leite & Jens Weidmann, 1999. "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth," IMF Working Papers 1999/085, International Monetary Fund.
    17. repec:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:37-75 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Bockstette, Valerie & Chanda, Areendam & Putterman, Louis, 2002. "States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 347-369, December.
    19. Miriam A. Golden & Lucio Picci, 2005. "Proposal For A New Measure Of Corruption, Illustrated With Italian Data," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 37-75, March.
    20. de la Croix,David & Michel,Philippe, 2002. "A Theory of Economic Growth," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521001151, September.
    21. Mr. Paolo Mauro, 1996. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure," IMF Working Papers 1996/098, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Cragg, John G. & Donald, Stephen G., 1993. "Testing Identifiability and Specification in Instrumental Variable Models," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 222-240, April.
    23. Roberto Rigobon & Dani Rodrik, 2005. "Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 13(3), pages 533-564, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Larissa Batrancea & Anca Nichita & Ioan Batrancea & Lucian Gaban, 2018. "The Strenght of the Relationship Between Shadow Economy and Corruption: Evidence from a Worldwide Country-Sample," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 1119-1143, August.
    2. Wensheng Xiao & Yu Tang & Bright Obuobi & Shaojian Qu & Minglan Yuan & Decai Tang, 2023. "The Influence of Rule of Law on Government’s Sustainable Economic Management: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(15), pages 1-23, July.
    3. David Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2009. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 187-219, July.
    4. Pierre Pecher, 2018. "Ethnic divisions and the effect of appropriative competition intensity on economic performance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 165-193, May.
    5. Ben Mimoun Mohamed, 2013. "Assessing the Short‐ and Long‐run Real Effects of Public External Debt: The Case of Tunisia," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 25(4), pages 587-606, December.
    6. Feng, Jie & Gao, Junhong, 2023. "Natural resource curse hypothesis and governance: Understanding the role of rule of law and political risk in the context of China," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(PB).
    7. Mohamed Ben Mimoun & Asma Raies, 2022. "Is social spending pro‐poor in developing countries? The role of governance and political freedom," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(3), pages 214-241, September.
    8. Leonardo A. Lanzona Jr., 2019. "Agrarian Reform and Democracy: Lessons from the Philippine Experience," Millennial Asia, , vol. 10(3), pages 272-298, December.
    9. repec:prg:jnlpep:v:preprint:id:647:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Tamara Fioroni & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Giovanni Trovato, 2023. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Economic Growth," Discussion Papers 2023/298, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    11. Panagiotis Arsenis & Dimitrios Varvarigos, 2011. "Corruption, Fertility, and Human Capital," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/28, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2011.
    12. Kumara, Ajantha Sisira & Handapangoda, Wasana Sampath, 2014. "Political environment a ground for public sector corruption? Evidence from a cross-country analysis," MPRA Paper 54721, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2014.
    13. Omar A. Guerrero & Gonzalo Castañeda, 2021. "Does expenditure in public governance guarantee less corruption? Non-linearities and complementarities of the rule of law," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 139-164, June.
    14. Qamar Abbas & Li Junqing & Muhammad Ramzan & Sumbal Fatima, 2021. "Role of Governance in Debt-Growth Relationship: Evidence from Panel Data Estimations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-19, May.
    15. Marek Tomaszewski, 2018. "Corruption - A Dark Side of Entrepreneurship. Corruption and Innovations," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(3), pages 251-269.
    16. Omar A. Guerrero & Gonzalo Casta~neda, 2019. "Does Better Governance Guarantee Less Corruption? Evidence of Loss in Effectiveness of the Rule of Law," Papers 1902.00428, arXiv.org.
    17. Maiga Nouhoun Oumarou & Sirpe Gnanderman, 2023. "Optimal size of public expenditure in the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 43(1), pages 146-160.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2009. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 187-219, July.
    2. David de la Croix & Axel Gosseries, 2007. "Procreation, Migration and Tradable Quotas," Chapters, in: Robert L. Clark & Naohiro Ogawa & Andrew Mason (ed.), Population Aging, Intergenerational Transfers and the Macroeconomy, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Alvar Kangur, 2008. "What rules in the 'deep' determinants of comparative development?," Economics Series Working Papers 386, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Stephen Knowles & P. Dorian Owen, 2010. "Which Institutions are Good for Your Health? The Deep Determinants of Comparative Cross-country Health Status," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(4), pages 701-723.
    5. William Hauk & Romain Wacziarg, 2009. "A Monte Carlo study of growth regressions," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 103-147, June.
    6. Martin Strieborny & Madina Kukenova, 2016. "Investment in Relationship-Specific Assets: Does Finance Matter?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1487-1515.
    7. Lee, Angela Y. & Aaker, Jennifer L., 2006. "A Monte Carlo Study of Growth Regressions," Research Papers 1836r1, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    8. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Katsuyuki Naito & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017. "Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 115-142, January.
    9. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides, 2008. "Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(4), pages 1375-1405, November.
    10. Rockey, James, 2012. "Reconsidering the fiscal effects of constitutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 313-323.
    11. P. Dorian Owen, 2017. "Evaluating Ingenious Instruments for Fundamental Determinants of Long-Run Economic Growth and Development," Econometrics, MDPI, vol. 5(3), pages 1-33, September.
    12. Trung V. Vu, 2022. "Does institutional quality foster economic complexity? The fundamental drivers of productive capabilities," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 1571-1604, September.
    13. Vatcharin Sirimaneetham, 2006. "What drives liberal policies in developing countries?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 06/587, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    14. Jellema, Jon & Roland, Gerard, 2011. "Institutional clusters and economic performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 108-132.
    15. Licht, Amir N. & Goldschmidt, Chanan & Schwartz, Shalom H., 2007. "Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-688, December.
    16. Abdelkarim Yahyaoui & Atef Rahmani, 2009. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Role of Institutional Quality," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 56(3), pages 327-357, September.
    17. Toke S. Aidt, 2011. "Corruption and Sustainable Development," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Breuer, Janice Boucher & McDermott, John, 2013. "Respect, responsibility, and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 36-47.
    19. Joao Tovar Jalles, 2010. "Does democracy foster or hinder growth? Extreme-type political regimes in a large panel," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(2), pages 1359-1372.
    20. Vieira, Flávio & MacDonald, Ronald & Damasceno, Aderbal, 2012. "The role of institutions in cross-section income and panel data growth models: A deeper investigation on the weakness and proliferation of instruments," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 127-140.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic growth; corruption; rule of law; incentive constraint; political power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Virginie LEBLANC (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iruclbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.