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The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments

Author

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  • Mamoru Kaneko

    (University of Tsukuba)

Abstract
This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of the new concept is based on that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, or more precisely, rather on their interpretation of it which they call "standards of behavior." This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This paper provides the definition and considers the new solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of sexes and games with a continuum of players.

Suggested Citation

  • Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 601, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:601
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0601.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gardner, Roy, 1977. "Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 513-517, December.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1973. "Equilibrium points of nonatomic games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 146, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Dubey, Pradeep & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1994. "Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-293, May.
    5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
    2. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1982. "Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 281-290, October.
    3. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
    4. M. Kaneko, 1984. "On interpersonal utility comparisons," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1(3), pages 165-175, October.
    5. Donald Saari, 1989. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 819, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Amritkar, R.E., 1996. "Structures in coupled map lattices," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 224(1), pages 382-389.

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