[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/crs/wpaper/2024-15.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Price & Choose

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Echenique

    (UC Berkeley)

  • Matías Núñez

    (CREST, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, ENSAE)

Abstract
We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price & Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments, from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a model without quasi-linear utility, to a setting with an outside option, robustness to max-min behavior and caps on prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique & Matías Núñez, 2024. "Price & Choose," Working Papers 2024-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2024-15
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2024-15.pdf
    File Function: CREST working paper version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; Subgame-perfect implementation; Mechanism; Prices.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2024-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crestfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.