Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition
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- Claude Fluet & Dominique Demougin, 2001. "Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(2), pages 489-496.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998.
"Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 622-622, December.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9602, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
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- Budde, Jörg & Kräkel, Matthias, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 6/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Marie‐Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009.
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- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0730, CIRPEE.
- Xie, Jia, 2011. "Ranking of signals in multitask agency models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 82-84, July.
- Fluet, Claude, 2010.
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- Claude Fluet, 2006. "Liability Rules under Evidentiary Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche 0606, CIRPEE.
- Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2007.
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- Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," CESifo Working Paper Series 969, CESifo.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002.
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- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-18, CIRANO.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1501-1509, September.
- Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2000. "Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 120, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
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More about this item
Keywords
agency problem; information systems; likelihood ratio; mean preserving spread criterion; integral criterion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-1999-03-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-1999-03-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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