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Official Sector Lending Strategies during the Euro Area Crisis

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  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Erce, Aitor
  • Uy, Timothy
Abstract
In response to the euro area crisis, European policymakers took a gradual, incremental approach to official lending, at first relying on the approach followed by the International Monetary Fund, then developing their own crisis resolution framework. We review this development, marked by a substantial divergence in the terms of official loans offered to the crisis countries by the IMF and the euro area official lenders. Based on a unique dataset, we use event analysis to assess the impact of changing maturity and spreads of official loans on bond yields, liquidity and market access. In light of the euro area experience, we discuss arguments for rebalancing Debt Sustainability Analysis and programme design in favour of cash-flow management. While the official assistance granted to crisis countries in the euro area may not be replicable elsewhere, key lessons from it could foster a reconsideration of the modalities by which official lending institutions handle crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Corsetti, Giancarlo & Erce, Aitor & Uy, Timothy, 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies during the Euro Area Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 12228, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12228
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Philippe Martin & Todd E Messer, 2020. "The Economics of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and the Eurozone Crisis," Working Papers hal-03813806, HAL.
    2. Christophe Destais & Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "The design of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism for the euro area: Choices and trade-offs," CEPII Policy Brief 2019-25, CEPII research center.
    3. Sebastian Horn & Bradley C. Parks & Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "China as an International Lender of Last Resort," NBER Working Papers 31105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. van Riet, Ad, 2018. "Modern financial repression in the euro area crisis: making high public debt sustainable?," MPRA Paper 92649, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Giovannini, Alessandro & Ioannou, Demosthenes & Stracca, Livio, 2022. "Public and private risk sharing: friends or foes? The interplay between different forms of risk sharing," Occasional Paper Series 295, European Central Bank.
    6. Horn, Sebastian & Meyer, Josefin & Trebesch, Christoph, 2020. "European community bonds since the oil crisis: Lessons for today?," Kiel Policy Brief 136e, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    7. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Erce, Aitor & Uy, Timothy, 2018. "Debt Sustainability and the Terms of Official Support," CEPR Discussion Papers 13292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Roman Garcia & Dimitri Lorenzani & Daniel Monteiro & Francesco Perticari & Bořek Vašíček & Lukas Vogel, 2021. "Financial Spillover and Contagion Risks in the Euro Area in 2007-2019," European Economy - Discussion Papers 137, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    9. Horn, Sebastian & Meyer, Josefin & Trebesch, Christoph, 2020. "Europäische Gemeinschaftsanleihen seit der Ölkrise: Lehren für heute?," Kiel Policy Brief 136, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    10. Toyofuku, Kenta, 2021. "Unit of account, sovereign debt, and optimal currency area," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crisis management; Debt sustainability; Loans maturity; Market access; Private sector involvement; Seniority; Yield curve;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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