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Competition, Product Proliferation and Welfare: A Study of the U.S. Smartphone Market

Author

Listed:
  • Fan, Ying
  • Yang, Chenyu
Abstract
This paper studies (1) whether, from a welfare point of view, oligopolistic competition leads to too few or too many products in a market, and (2) how a change in competition affects the number and the composition of product offerings. We address these two questions in the context of the U.S. smartphone market. Our findings show the market contains too few products and that a reduction in competition decreases both product number and product variety. These results suggest that merger policies should be stricter when we take into account the effects of a merger on product choice in addition to those on pricing.

Suggested Citation

  • Fan, Ying & Yang, Chenyu, 2016. "Competition, Product Proliferation and Welfare: A Study of the U.S. Smartphone Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 11423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11423
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous product choice; Product proliferation; Merger; Smartphone industry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

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