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The political economy of coastal development

Author

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  • Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet
  • Magontier, Pierre
  • Solé-Ollé, Albert
Abstract
Coastal amenities are common goods. When deciding on the amount of coastal development, local governments might not internalize the impact of their decision on non-residents' welfare. We contend that political alignment between neighboring local governments facilitates cooperation, helping restrain coastal overdevelopment. We leverage causal effects by applying a close-elections Regression Discontinuity Design to the universe of buildings in Spain. We find that municipalities with mayors belonging to the party controlling most municipalities in the same coastal area develop 32% less land than politically isolated municipalities. We also show that politically homogeneous coastal areas develop less than their fragmented counterparts. Both effects are larger for land closest to shore and in municipalities and coastal areas with a large share of land included in nature preservation zones.

Suggested Citation

  • Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet & Magontier, Pierre & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2021. "The political economy of coastal development," CEPR Discussion Papers 15780, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15780
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local government; Land use policy; Political parties;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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