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A Political Model of Trust

Author

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  • Sonin, Konstantin
  • Eilat, Ran
  • Agranov, Marina
Abstract
We analyze a model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the elite that forms endogenously to aggregate information. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only if voters trust the elite's endorsement of potentially biased candidates. When inequality is high, the elite's informational advantage is minimized by the voters' distrust. When inequality reaches a certain threshold, the trust, and thus the information transmission, breaks down completely. Finally, the elite size and thus the extent of information aggregation depends on the amount of trust they can maintain.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonin, Konstantin & Eilat, Ran & Agranov, Marina, 2020. "A Political Model of Trust," CEPR Discussion Papers 14672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14672
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    Cited by:

    1. Flavio Delbono, 2020. "Le diseguaglianze in Italia nella stagione del Covid-19," QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2020(111), pages 73-86.
    2. Maria Greve & Michael Fritsch & Michael Wyrwich, 2023. "Long‐term decline of regions and the rise of populism: The case of Germany," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 409-445, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trust; Inequality; Political economy; Cheap talk; Information club;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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