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Allocation of Implementing Power: Evidence from World Bank Projects

Author

Listed:
  • Silvia Marchesi

    (University of Milano Bicocca and Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano)

  • Tania Masi

    (University of Milano Bicocca)

Abstract
In this paper we explore the factors that determine the level at which World Bank projects are implemented. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is influenced by the relative importance of local information at the recipient country level. Using an AidData dataset that provides information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we find that transparency does influence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More specifically, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability that a World Bank project will be implemented locally by 3 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2019. "Allocation of Implementing Power: Evidence from World Bank Projects," Development Working Papers 447, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    • Handle: RePEc:csl:devewp:447
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    World Bank projects; Implementing Agency; Transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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