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A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV / AIDS

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Abstract
We study the dynamic stability of fidelity networks, which are networks that form in a mating economy of agents of two types (say men and women), where each agent desires direct links with opposite type agents, while engaging in multiple partnerships is considered an act of infidelity. Infidelity is punished more severely for women than for men. We consider two stochastic processes in which agents form and sever links over time based on the reward from doing so, but may also take non-beneficial actions with small probability. In the first process, an agent who invests more time in a relationship makes it stronger and harder to break by his/her partner; in the second, such an agent is perceived as weak. Under the first process, only egalitarian pairwise stable networks (in which all agents have the same number of partners) are visited in the long run, while under the second, only anti-egalitarian pairwise stable networks (in which all women are matched to a small number of men) are. Next, we apply these results to find that, in the long run, under the first process, HIV/AIDS is equally prevalent among men and women, while under the second, women bear a greater burden. The key message is that anti-female discrimination does not necessarily lead to (weakly) higher HIV/AIDS prevalence among women in the short run, but it does in the long run.

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  • Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV / AIDS," Working Papers wp2009_0909, CEMFI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2009_0909
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Cahu & Falilou Fall, 2011. "Accounting for the effects of AIDS on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00609798, HAL.
    2. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers wp2009_0911, CEMFI.
    3. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    4. Itay P. Fainmesser, 2012. "Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 32-69, February.
    5. Baland, Jean-Marie & Aldashev, Gani, 2012. "Awareness and AIDS: A Political Economy Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 8908, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Paul Cahu & Falilou Fall & Roland Pongou, 2014. "Beauty, Polygyny, and Fertility: Theory and Evidence," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14078, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Pongou, Roland & Serrano, Roberto, 2016. "Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 147-163.
    8. Pongou, Roland & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies," MPRA Paper 46021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked politics: political cycles and instability under social influences," MPRA Paper 65641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Fidelity Networks and Long-Run Trends in HIV/AIDS Gender Gaps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 298-302, May.
    11. Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked Politics: Political Cycles and Instability under Social Influences," MPRA Paper 65598, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General

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