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Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)

Author

Listed:
  • Sébastien BROOS
  • Axel GAUTIER
  • Jorge MARCOS RAMOS
  • Nicolas PETIT
Abstract
Our paper brings together an original dataset comprising all cartels fined by the European Commission since May 2004. We present a set of statistical results relating to cartel design and cartel enforcement both at the Commission and General Court?s level. The research highlights the importance of leniency applications and recidivist considerations. We show that more than half of the undertakings are leniency applicants. These benefit from a 37% fine reduction on average. Further, recidivism is quite frequent as it concerns 27% of cases. Nevertheless, the fine increase is not systematic. Our research puts in perspective the importance of ?appeals? before the General Court where 63% of the fines are upheld. Lastly, our research focuses on the factors influencing the outcome of an appeal, notably the importance of the case. Classification JEL : K21, K40, L41.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien BROOS & Axel GAUTIER & Jorge MARCOS RAMOS & Nicolas PETIT, 2016. "Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2872, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2872
    Note: In : Revue Economique, 67, 79-94, 2016
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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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