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Household behavior and individual autonomy

Author

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  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe
Abstract
The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the ‘collective’ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2009. "Household behavior and individual autonomy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009022
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lechene, Valérie & Preston, Ian, 2011. "Noncooperative household demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 504-527, March.
    2. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2010. "Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(545), pages 786-799, June.
    3. Claude d'Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2007. "Competition For Market Share Or For Market Size: Oligopolistic Equilibria With Varying Competitive Toughness," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 761-784, August.
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    7. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2006. "Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-14, March.
    8. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
    9. d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2009. "Price-quantity competition with varying toughness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 62-82, January.
    10. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-748, October.
    11. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    12. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    13. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods," IFS Working Papers W05/06, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    14. Bruce Bradbury, 2004. "Consumption and the Within-household Income Distribution: Outcomes from an Australian "Natural Experiment"," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 50(3), pages 501-540.
    15. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger, 2017. "Do husbands and wives pool their incomes? A couple experiment," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 779-805, September.
    2. Paula GOBBI, 2013. "Childcare and Commitment within Households," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2013019, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    3. Marie-Louise Leroux & Grégory Ponthière, 2009. "Wives, husbands and wheelchairs: Optimal tax policy under gender-specific health," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575059, HAL.
    4. Udo Ebert, 2013. "The relationship between individual and household measures of WTP and WTA," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 367-390, February.
    5. Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger, 2012. "Do husbands and wives pool their incomes? Experimental evidence," Working Papers of BETA 2012-10, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2011. "Revealed Preference Analysis of Non‐Cooperative Household Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1073-1096, September.
    7. Cherchye, L.J.H. & Demuynck, T. & de Rock, B., 2009. "Degrees of Cooperation in Household Consumption Models : A Revealed Preference Analysis," Discussion Paper 2009-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Marie-Louise Leroux & Grégory Ponthière, 2013. "Optimal prevention when coexistence matters," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 1095-1127, July.
    9. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.34, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    intra-household allocation; household financial management; degree of autonomy; Lindahl prices; local income pooling; separate spheres;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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