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Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections

Author

Listed:
  • ANDERSON, S.P.

    (University of Virginia)

  • KATZ, A.

    (Virginia Polytecnic Institute)

  • THISSE, Jacques-François

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract
The literature on stochastic voting to date has focused almost exclusively on models with only two candidates (or parties). This paper studies multiparty competition with stochastic voting. We look at two different models in which candidates aim to maximize their expected vote, as well as a model where the objective of candidates is rank minimization. The equilibria of these models are derived and characterized. We show that the properties of the equilibria are quite different from those derived in deterministic models. Furthermore, the analysis shows that deterministic voting models are not robust since the introduction of even a minute level of uncertainty leads to a drastic change in predictions. Consequently, we argue that thc deterministic model provides a misleading benchmark. Stochastic models providc a much richer framework, and the nature of the uncertainty in voter choice is a kcy determinant of thc qualitative properties of the equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • ANDERSON, S.P. & KATZ, A. & THISSE, Jacques-François, 1992. "Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1992046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1992046
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1992.html
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Lambertini, 2014. "Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, in: Josef Haunschmied & Vladimir M. Veliov & Stefan Wrzaczek (ed.), Dynamic Games in Economics, edition 127, pages 187-204, Springer.
    2. L. Lambertini, 2010. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 108-119, April.
    3. Dodge Cahan & Hongjia H. Chen & Louis Christie & Arkadii Slinko, 2021. "Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don’t always go to the closest firm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 945-970, December.

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