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Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run

Author

Listed:
  • Karl-Martin Ehrhart
  • Claudia Keser
Abstract
In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions. Lorsque les sujets peuvent changer de groupes dans les expériences sur les contributions volontaires aux biens publics, nous observons que les sujets plus coopératifs délaissent les sujets moins coopératifs. De plus, ces derniers essaient de joindre les groupes coopératifs pour profiter comme resquilleurs de leurs contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-24, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:99s-24
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/99s-24.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Abel Musgrave, 1939. "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 53(2), pages 213-237.
    2. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
    3. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    4. Keser, Claudia, 1997. "SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-24, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Tiebout hypothesis; migration; experimental economics; Biens publics; hypothèse de Tiebout; migration; économie expérimentale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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