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Do Index Funds Monitor?

Author

Listed:
  • Davidson Heath

    (University of Utah David Eccles School of Business)

  • Daniele Macciocchi

    (University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business)

  • Roni Michaely

    (University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute)

  • Matthew Ringgenberg

    (University of Utah - Department of Finance)

Abstract
We examine whether the rise of index investing leads to increased agency conflicts. Using a new research design that generates exogenous variation in fund holdings, we find that index funds are weak monitors. Unlike active funds, index funds rarely vote against firm management on corporate governance issues. Moreover, although index funds do exit 16% of their holdings each year, they do not use exit to enforce good governance. They also rarely file a Schedule 13D, indicating they do not intend to affect firm policies. Our results show the rise of index investing is shifting control from investors to corporate managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Davidson Heath & Daniele Macciocchi & Roni Michaely & Matthew Ringgenberg, 2019. "Do Index Funds Monitor?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 19-08, Swiss Finance Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1908
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    File URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3259433
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    Cited by:

    1. Santhosh Ramalingegowda & Steven Utke & Yong Yu, 2021. "Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 208-241, March.
    2. Deng, Mengdie & Lin, Tse-Chun & Zhou, Jiayu, 2024. "Does better liquidity for large orders attract institutional investors and analysts? Evidence from the Tick Size Pilot Program," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Shane S. Dikolli & Mary Margaret Frank & Zhe Michael Guo & Luann J. Lynch, 2022. "Walk the talk: ESG mutual fund voting on shareholder proposals," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 864-896, September.
    4. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment," OSF Preprints 8n6xj, Center for Open Science.
    5. Jiang, Yahan & Wang, Cai & Li, Sha & Wan, Jing, 2022. "Do institutional investors' corporate site visits improve ESG performance? Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    6. Baig, Ahmed & DeLisle, R. Jared & Zaynutdinova, Gulnara R., 2022. "Index mutual fund ownership and financial reporting quality," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    7. Marta Khomyn, 2020. "Essays on Modern Market Structure," PhD Thesis, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2-2020, January-A.
    8. Dong, Yunhe & Luo, Haoyi & Xu, Zijin & Yang, Xing, 2024. "Investing while lending: Do index funds improve managerial information disclosure?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    9. Gormley, Todd A. & Gupta, Vishal K. & Matsa, David A. & Mortal, Sandra C. & Yang, Lukai, 2023. "The Big Three and board gender diversity: The effectiveness of shareholder voice," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(2), pages 323-348.
    10. Braun, Benjamin, 2021. "From exit to control: The structural power of finance under asset manager capitalism," SocArXiv 4uesc, Center for Open Science.
    11. David, Thomas & Di Giuli, Alberta & Romec, Arthur, 2023. "CEO reputation and shareholder voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    12. Davidson Heath & Daniele Macciocchi & Roni Michaely & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, 2023. "Does Socially Responsible Investing Change Firm Behavior?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(6), pages 2057-2083.
    13. Andrea Pawliczek & A. Nicole Skinner & Laura A. Wellman, 2021. "A new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 1088-1136, September.
    14. Ni, Xiaoran & Yin, David, 2023. "Is institutional common ownership commonly priced? Insights from the cost of equity capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    15. Benjamin Bennett & René M. Stulz & Zexi Wang, 2020. "Does Joining the S&P 500 Index Hurt Firms?," NBER Working Papers 27593, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Chen, Sheng-Syan & Huang, Chia-Wei & Lin, Chih-Yen, 2023. "Does CEO general managerial ability matter in M&A voting?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 14-24.
    17. Li, Xuan, 2023. "Home bias in shareholder voting," Discussion Papers 2023/21, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    18. Kristopher Gerardi & Michelle Lowry & Carola Schenone, 2023. "A Critical Review of the Common Ownership Literature," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2023-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    19. Chinco, Alex & Sammon, Marco, 2024. "The passive ownership share is double what you think it is," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    20. Chen, Shenglan & Ma, Hui & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2023. "Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    21. Yoonsik Hong & Yanghoon Kim & Jeonghun Kim & Yongmin Choi, 2022. "Index Tracking via Learning to Predict Market Sensitivities," Papers 2209.00780, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    22. Foroughi, Pouyan & Marcus, Alan & Nguyen, Vinh, 2024. "Mutual fund pollution experience and environmental voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    governance; index investing; monitoring; passive investing; voting; exit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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