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Creating a Euro Area Safe Asset without Mutualizing Risk (Much)

Author

Listed:
  • Álvaro Leandro
  • Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Abstract
This paper explains and evaluates three proposals to create “safe assets” for the euro area based on sovereign bonds, in which sovereign risk is limited through diversification and some form of seniority. These assets would be held by banks and other financial institutions, replacing concentrated exposures to their own sovereigns. The paper focuses on three ideas: (1) to create multitranche “sovereign bond-backed securities” (SBBS), of which the senior tranche would constitute a safe asset; (2) to create a senior, publicly owned financial intermediary that would issue a bond backed by a diversified portfolio of sovereign loans (“E-bonds”); and (3) to issue sovereign bonds in several tranches and induce banks to hold a diversified pool of senior sovereign bonds (“multitranche national bond issuance”). Public attention (including public criticism) has so far focused on the first idea; the other two have not yet been seriously debated. We find that none of the competing proposals entirely dominates the others. SBBS do not deserve most of the criticism to which they have been subjected. At the same time, E-bond and multi-tranche national bond issuance have several interesting features—including inducing fiscal discipline—and warrant further exploration.

Suggested Citation

  • Álvaro Leandro & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2019. "Creating a Euro Area Safe Asset without Mutualizing Risk (Much)," CESifo Working Paper Series 7766, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7766
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josefin Meyer & Carmen M Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2022. "Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1615-1680.
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    5. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy [Greek bond buyback boondoggle]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563.
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    7. Jakob von Weizsäcker & Jacques Delpla, 2010. "The Blue Bond Proposal," Policy Briefs 403, Bruegel.
    8. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Álvaro Leandro, 2018. "Europe's Search for a Safe Asset," Policy Briefs PB18-20, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    9. Lee Buchheit & Chanda DeLong & Guillaume Chabert & Jeromin Zettlemeyer, 2019. "How to Restructure Sovereign Debt: Lessons from Four Decades," Working Paper Series WP19-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Spyros Alogoskoufis & Sam Langfield, 2020. "Regulating the Doom Loop," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 251-292, September.
    2. Daniel Monteiro, 2023. "Macrofinancial Dynamics in a Monetary Union," European Economy - Discussion Papers 188, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    3. Frey, Rüdiger & Kurt, Kevin & Damian, Camilla, 2020. "How safe are european safe bonds? An analysis from the perspective of modern credit risk models," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    4. Debrun, Xavier & Masuch, Klaus & Ferrero, Guiseppe & Vansteenkiste, Isabel & Ferdinandusse, Marien & von Thadden, Leopold & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Alloza, Mario & Derouen, Chloé & Bańkowski, Krzyszto, 2021. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 273, European Central Bank.
    5. Bauer, Christian & Adolph, Marc-Patrick, 2021. "Limited joint liability in structured Eurobonds: Pricing the political costs," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    safe assets; sovereign debt; banking crisis; euro crisis; eurobonds; ESBies; SBBS; E-bonds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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