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Endogenous Timing and the Taxation of Discrete Investment Choices

Author

Listed:
  • Paolo Panteghini
Abstract
This article discusses the effects of taxation on the discrete choice of alternative projects. In particular, it is shown that if taxation affects the optimal timing of irreversible investment, then the discrete choice is distorted as well. This result has both methodological and political implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Panteghini, 2002. "Endogenous Timing and the Taxation of Discrete Investment Choices," CESifo Working Paper Series 723, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_723
    as

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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/723.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luis H. R. Alvarez & Erkki Koskela, 2005. "Progressive Taxation and Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 1377, CESifo.
    2. Lukach, R. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers using Patent Citations : Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data," Other publications TiSEM d78bf59a-e0ff-4451-86b9-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Paolo Panteghini, 2004. "Wide vs. Narrow Tax Bases under Optimal Investment Timing," CESifo Working Paper Series 1246, CESifo.
    4. Paolo Panteghini & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Competing for Foreign Direct Investments: A Real Options Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 929, CESifo.
    5. Paolo M. Panteghini, 2003. "A dynamic measure of the effective tax rate," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(15), pages 1-7.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2003:i:15:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    effective average tax rate; timing and real options;

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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