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Corruption in Russia - Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature

Author

Listed:
  • Günther G. Schulze
  • Nikita Zakharov
Abstract
This paper argues that corruption in Russia is systemic in nature. Low wage levels of public officials provide strong incentives to engage in corruption. As corruption is illegal, corrupt officials can be exposed any time, which enforces loyalty towards the powers that be; thus corruption is a method of governance. We trace the systemic corruption back to the Mongolian empire and demonstrate its persistence to the current regime. We show the geographic distribution of contemporary corruption within Russia, survey the literature on the causes, consequences, and cures of corruption in Russia, and discuss entry points to fighting it.

Suggested Citation

  • Günther G. Schulze & Nikita Zakharov, 2018. "Corruption in Russia - Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature," CESifo Working Paper Series 6864, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6864
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6864.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zakharov, Nikita, 2019. "Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 39-61.
    2. Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2023. "Why do farmers seek office? Regulatory capture in Russian agricultural subsidization," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(2), pages 111-130.
    3. Çağatay Bircan & Ralph De Haas, 2020. "The Limits of Lending? Banks and Technology Adoption across Russia," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(2), pages 536-609.
    4. repec:zbw:bofitp:2022_002 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Alexeev, Michael & Zakharov, Nikita, 2022. "Who profits from windfalls in oil tax revenue? Inequality, protests, and the role of corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 472-492.
    6. CHEN, Xuezheng & GUI, Lin & WU, Tao & ZHANG, Jun, 2024. "A theory of symbiotic corruption," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 478-494.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; governance; institutions; political economy; history; Russia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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