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Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services

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  • Nava Ashraf
  • Oriana Bandiera
  • Scott Lee
Abstract
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for nurses in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. We randomize the offer of career benefits at the recruitment stage. In line with common wisdom, treatment attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off only exists at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally pro-social. These are hired, and the perform better at every step of the chain; they deliver more services, promote institutional childbirth and reduce child malnutrition by 25% in the communities they serve.

Suggested Citation

  • Nava Ashraf & Oriana Bandiera & Scott Lee, 2014. "Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 065, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:stieop:065
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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