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Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Gilbert, Richard
  • Hastings, Justine
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between the structure of the market for the refining and distribution of gasoline and the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline sold to independent gasoline retailers. Theoretically, the effect of an increase in vertical integration is ambiguous because opposing forces act to increase and decrease wholesale prices. We empirically examine the effects of vertical and horizontal market structures on wholesale prices using both a broad panel and an event analysis. The panel covers twenty-six metropolitan areas from January 1993 through June 1997. The event is a merger of Tosco and Unocal in 1997 that changed the vertical and horizontal structure of thirteen West Coast metropolitan areas. Both data sets show that an increase in the degree of vertical integration is associated with higher wholesale prices

Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert, Richard & Hastings, Justine, 2001. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6nf907n4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt6nf907n4
    as

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    File URL: https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6nf907n4.pdf;origin=repeccitec
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pasirayi, Simbarashe & Richards, Timothy J., 2023. "Assessing the impact of manufacturer power on private label market share in an equilibrium framework," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    2. Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, 2007. "Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(2), pages 250-301.
    3. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," SOI - Working Papers 0212, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    4. Ricard Gil, 2010. "An empirical investigation of the Paramount antitrust case," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(2), pages 171-183.
    5. Erich J. Muehlegger, 2004. "Gasoline Price Spikes and Regional Gasoline Content Regulations - A Structural Approach," Working Papers 0421, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
    6. Chouinard, Hayley & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2002. "Gasoline Price Differences: Taxes, Pollution Regulations, Mergers, Market Power, and Market Conditions," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt2m60j5tp, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    7. Chouinard Hayley H & Perloff Jeffrey M, 2007. "Gasoline Price Differences: Taxes, Pollution Regulations, Mergers, Market Power, and Market Conditions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-28, January.
    8. Jorge Andrés Ferrando Yanez, 2002. "Incentive Regulation in Vertically Related Industries : Welfare Effects of Industry Structure and Institutional Coordination," Working Papers 2002-47, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    9. Jack (Xinlei) Chen & Om Narasimhan & George John & Tirtha Dhar, 2010. "An Empirical Investigation of Private Label Supply by National Label Producers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 738-755, 07-08.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    vertical integration; oligopoly; market power; gasoline; L13; L72; L22;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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